38.South Korea's Hopes for 'Peaceful Nuclear Sovereignty'

South Korea's Hopes for 'Peaceful Nuclear Sovereignty' October 23, 2010 | 1804 GMT JUNG YEON-JE/AFP/Getty Images Robert Einhorn, the U.S. State Department’s special adviser for nonproliferation and arms control, at a press conference in Seoul on Aug. 2 Summary South Korea and the United States will begin negotiations Oct. 25 on revisions to their bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement. Under the pact, signed in 1974, Seoul must get Washington’s permission to enrich uranium and reprocessed used nuclear fuel — a provision that Seoul says impedes its ambitious nuclear energy program. The United States will have concerns stemming from its nonproliferation efforts elsewhere around the world, as well as from the potential for increased tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Analysis South Korea and the United States will open negotiations in Washington on Oct. 25 to discuss the revision of their bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement. The agreement, signed in 1974, was meant to prohibit South Korea from enriching uranium and reprocessing used nuclear fuel without U.S. permission. The pact is set to expire in 2014, and negotiations are expected to conclude by 2013. South Korean Deputy Minister for Multilateral and Global Affairs Cho Hyun and U.S. State Department Special Adviser for Nonproliferation and Arms Control Robert Einhorn will lead the delegations to the talks. The agreement was signed amid U.S. concern over nuclear arms proliferation. Seoul’s secret attempt to begin a nuclear weapons program in the early 1970s led to U.S. suspicions about the country’s nuclear initiative, saying such an initiative would escalate tensions on the Korean Peninsula that could lead to another war. However, Seoul — increasingly reliant on nuclear energy — is finding the agreement stifling (particularly the stipulation about fuel reprocessing) and thus will attempt to renegotiate the agreement to get U.S. permission to reprocess spent fuel. The United States will have lingering concerns about this, particularly about a new spent fuel processing technology South Korea has developed and the potential increase in tensions the technology could cause on the Korean Peninsula. Seoul has used nuclear energy to keep up with the country’s growing energy demand despite the country’s lack of natural resources. As early as the 1970s, South Korea began an ambitious nuclear power program that paralleled the country’s industrialization policy. After South Korean President Lee Myung Bak took office in February 2008, Seoul stepped up its efforts to develop nuclear energy and sought to export its nuclear technology to the world market, including a number of countries in Middle East, Southeast Asia and Europe. Seoul currently has one of the most ambitious and dynamic nuclear power programs in the world. South Korea has said the limits imposed by the 1974 agreement with the United States — particularly the provision concerning fuel reprocessing — “excessively” impede its nuclear power program. Without the right and U.S. consent to reprocess used nuclear fuel, Seoul has claimed, facilities for storing used nuclear fuel from South Korea’s 20 nuclear power plants (not to mention the plants under construction) will reach capacity by 2016 at the current rate. Reprocessing would allow South Korea to recycle 94.4 percent of its nuclear waste as energy sources. The country also says the reprocessing is purely for industrial purposes, not for military use. Thus, South Korea is actively seeking to adjust the agreement’s provisions when it is renewed in order to get U.S. consent to reprocess used nuclear fuel. From Seoul’s perspective, autonomy in its nuclear program is the “peaceful nuclear sovereignty” that South Korean Knowledge Economy Minister Choi Kyung Hwan said South Korea should seek after the country won a $20 billion deal to build four reactors for the United Arab Emirates in December 2009. Although the reactors to be constructed in the United Arab Emirates deal are based on a U.S. design, Seoul hoped this contract and some other deals under discussion would be important considerations in negotiations over the agreement with Washington. One of the most contentious issues to be discussed during the upcoming meeting will be South Korea’s proposed pyroprocessing technology (dry processing), which Seoul is seeking long-term U.S. consent to use in processing spent nuclear fuel. Pyroprocessing is an electrolytic process to recover nuclear fuel from used rods. According to South Korea, the process would only partially separate weapons-grade plutonium and uranium from spent fuel and it is considered to be less capable of producing nuclear weapons. South Korea developed the technology in hopes that once the United States allows it, the process will address the nuclear waste issue in the long term. South Korea has signaled that it has every intention to pursue pyroprocessing technology; it has plans to build a pyroprocessing facility in 2011 and begin carrying out pyroprocessing fuel cycles by 2028. However, because separated plutonium from pyroprocessing would be usable in developing nuclear weapons, Washington has been extremely cautious about allowing the technology to be used in actual spent fuel. U.S concern over South Korea’s nuclear plans comes from its broader non-proliferation efforts around the world, such as in Iran and North Korea. Washington is concerned that South Korea’s spent fuel reprocessing would provide an excuse for other non-nuclear-weapon states to take a similar approach and move closer to developing nuclear weapons. In particular, it fears that South Korea’s pyroprocessing program, should it become active, would undermine the 1992 North-South Denuclearization declaration calling for the dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear program. Nonetheless, the United States has approved the reprocessing of U.S.-supplied nuclear fuel in Europe, Japan and India, though India is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. As a close U.S. ally in Northeast Asia, South Korea will push the United States hard to grant Seoul equal treatment. South Korea also could use North Korean nuclear fuel reprocessing and nuclear testing, which violated the 1992 agreement, to question its legitimacy, though it would not be able to use its threatening neighbor as an excuse to violate the agreement without arousing further U.S. suspicion. Seoul would continue insisting that its nuclear fuel reprocessing is for peaceful use. South Korea has set a precedent of pursing commercial and military missile programs that went against Washington’s will and ultimately forced the United States to lift prohibitions. However, Seoul does not want to create another problem — particularly over an extremely sensitive issue of global concern, such as nuclear energy and proliferation — that would test its relations with Washington. Thus, in order to win Washington’s trust regarding its nuclear program, South Korea needs to put forth long-term efforts to demonstrate its sincere commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. Seoul must convince Washington that nuclear weapons have never been an option for South Korea and that there is no risk of proliferation or a great threat to the balance of power in Northeast Asia. The eventual outcome of the upcoming talks in Washington is unclear. However, STRATFOR will monitor the negotiations closely to see whether the two sides appear to be making progress in reconciling their differences. Give us your thoughts  on this report For Publication Not For Publication Read comments on  other reports Reader Comments