Mullen: National Debt is a Security Threat
Written by Michael Cheek
National Security
Aug 27, 2010
The national debt is the single biggest threat to national security, according to Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Tax payers will be paying around $600 billion in interest on the national debt by 2012, the chairman told students and local leaders in Detroit.
“That’s one year’s worth of defense budget,” he said, adding that the Pentagon needs to cut back on spending.
“We’re going to have to do that if it’s going to survive at all,” Mullen said, “and do it in a way that is predictable.”
He also called on the defense industry to hire veterans and become more robust in the future.
“I need the defense industry, in particular, to be robust,” he said. “My procurement budget is over $100 billion, [and] I need to be able to leverage that as much as possible with those [companies] who reach out [to veterans].”
Mullen highlighted the unity of purpose between the government and industry as well, in working to solve national security issues.
“I have found that universally, [private-sector workers] care every bit as much about our country, are every bit as patriotic and wanting to make a difference … as those who wear the uniform and are in harm’s way,” he said.
domingo, 29 de agosto de 2010
5. Diabetes: What Really Ails China
Diabetes: What Really Ails China
By César Chelala
The Globalist
Monday, August 23, 2010
While China recently overtook Japan to become the world’s second-largest economy, the country is experiencing growing pains on a number of fronts, ranging from environmental concerns to labor unrest. However, as César Chelala argues, one of the most overlooked consequences of China’s increasing prosperity is a sharp rise in the incidence of diabetes.
China’s struggle with diabetes has reached epidemic proportions. This is the conclusion of a group of researchers from Tulane University, whose findings were recently published in the New England Journal of Medicine, one of the United States’ most prestigious medical journals.
China has edged ahead of India to become the country with the largest population of diabetics in the world.
According to the study, 92.4 million adults in China age 20 or older (almost 10% of the population) have diabetes, and 148.2 million adults have pre-diabetes, a condition that is a key risk factor for developing overt diabetes and/or cardiovascular disease. Of particular significance is the finding that the majority of cases of diabetes are undiagnosed and untreated.
These new figures indicate that China has edged ahead of India to become the country with the largest population of diabetics in the world. Most cases of diabetes are from so-called type two diabetes, a form of the disease that accounts for 90-95% of all diabetes cases among adults. It results from insulin resistance and is sometimes combined with an absolute insulin deficiency.
The diabetes epidemic is not only a serious public health problem — it can also have serious economic repercussions. A study found that estimated medical costs for diabetes and its complications were 18.2% of China’s total health expenditures in 2007. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that diabetes, heart disease and stroke will cost China approximately $558 billion between 2006 and 2015.
Until just over a decade ago, diabetes was relatively rare in China. However, in the last decade the problem has become much more severe. Experts believe that China’s rapid economic development — and the increased urbanization, physical inactivity, unhealthy diet and obesity that often accompany increased prosperity — is an important contributing factor in the development of the disease.
The diabetes epidemic is not only a serious public health problem — it can also have serious economic repercussions.
Environmental toxins may also contribute to recent increases in the rate of type two diabetes. This is the opinion of some experts, who found a positive correlation between the concentration in the urine of bisphenol A, a constituent of some plastics, and the incidence of type two diabetes.
Obesity has been found to contribute approximately 55% to an individual’s development of type two diabetes. A study on the importance of lifestyle factors showed that those who had high levels of physical activity, a healthy diet, did not smoke and consumed alcohol only in moderation had an 82% lower rate of diabetes. When a normal weight was included, the rate was 89% lower.
The increased rate of childhood obesity between 1960 and 2000 is believed to have led to the increase of type two diabetes in children and adolescents. There were more than 60 million obese people in China, and another 200 million who were overweight, according to a 2004 nationwide survey.
In the United States, type two diabetes affects approximately 8% of adults. That proportion increases to 18.3% among Americans age 60 and older, according to statistics from the American Diabetes Association. In comparison, the worldwide prevalence of diabetes among all age groups was estimated to be 2.8% in 2000, and will rise to 4.4% in 2030.
Diabetes and its consequences have become a major public health problem not only in China, but in many industrialized countries as well. To avoid further damage to people’s health, it is imperative to develop and institute national strategies for preventing, detecting and treating diabetes in the general population.
By César Chelala
The Globalist
Monday, August 23, 2010
While China recently overtook Japan to become the world’s second-largest economy, the country is experiencing growing pains on a number of fronts, ranging from environmental concerns to labor unrest. However, as César Chelala argues, one of the most overlooked consequences of China’s increasing prosperity is a sharp rise in the incidence of diabetes.
China’s struggle with diabetes has reached epidemic proportions. This is the conclusion of a group of researchers from Tulane University, whose findings were recently published in the New England Journal of Medicine, one of the United States’ most prestigious medical journals.
China has edged ahead of India to become the country with the largest population of diabetics in the world.
According to the study, 92.4 million adults in China age 20 or older (almost 10% of the population) have diabetes, and 148.2 million adults have pre-diabetes, a condition that is a key risk factor for developing overt diabetes and/or cardiovascular disease. Of particular significance is the finding that the majority of cases of diabetes are undiagnosed and untreated.
These new figures indicate that China has edged ahead of India to become the country with the largest population of diabetics in the world. Most cases of diabetes are from so-called type two diabetes, a form of the disease that accounts for 90-95% of all diabetes cases among adults. It results from insulin resistance and is sometimes combined with an absolute insulin deficiency.
The diabetes epidemic is not only a serious public health problem — it can also have serious economic repercussions. A study found that estimated medical costs for diabetes and its complications were 18.2% of China’s total health expenditures in 2007. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that diabetes, heart disease and stroke will cost China approximately $558 billion between 2006 and 2015.
Until just over a decade ago, diabetes was relatively rare in China. However, in the last decade the problem has become much more severe. Experts believe that China’s rapid economic development — and the increased urbanization, physical inactivity, unhealthy diet and obesity that often accompany increased prosperity — is an important contributing factor in the development of the disease.
The diabetes epidemic is not only a serious public health problem — it can also have serious economic repercussions.
Environmental toxins may also contribute to recent increases in the rate of type two diabetes. This is the opinion of some experts, who found a positive correlation between the concentration in the urine of bisphenol A, a constituent of some plastics, and the incidence of type two diabetes.
Obesity has been found to contribute approximately 55% to an individual’s development of type two diabetes. A study on the importance of lifestyle factors showed that those who had high levels of physical activity, a healthy diet, did not smoke and consumed alcohol only in moderation had an 82% lower rate of diabetes. When a normal weight was included, the rate was 89% lower.
The increased rate of childhood obesity between 1960 and 2000 is believed to have led to the increase of type two diabetes in children and adolescents. There were more than 60 million obese people in China, and another 200 million who were overweight, according to a 2004 nationwide survey.
In the United States, type two diabetes affects approximately 8% of adults. That proportion increases to 18.3% among Americans age 60 and older, according to statistics from the American Diabetes Association. In comparison, the worldwide prevalence of diabetes among all age groups was estimated to be 2.8% in 2000, and will rise to 4.4% in 2030.
Diabetes and its consequences have become a major public health problem not only in China, but in many industrialized countries as well. To avoid further damage to people’s health, it is imperative to develop and institute national strategies for preventing, detecting and treating diabetes in the general population.
4. "Enron Accounting" Has Bankrupted America: U.S. Deficit Really $202 Trillion, Kotlikoff Says
"Enron Accounting" Has Bankrupted America: U.S. Deficit Really $202 Trillion, Kotlikoff Says
Posted Aug 23, 2010 07:30am
By Peter Gorenstein in Investing, Recession, Politics
Yahoo Finance
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) forecasts the U.S. budget deficit will hit $1.3 trillion this year. An astronomical figure, to be sure, but that’s lower than was projected in March. It’s also less than last year’s record $1.41 trillion deficit, which was close to 10% of GDP.
And, that's the good news.
As the deficit grows so does the national debt, which is currently more than $13.3 trillion, according to official figures.
But the situation is actually much, much worse, according to Boston University economics professor Laurence Kotlikoff.
“Forget the official debt,” he tells Aaron in this clip. The “real” deficit - including non-budgetary items like unfunded liabilities of Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security and the defense budget - is actually $202 trillion, the professor and author calculates; or 15 times the “official" numbers.
“Congress has engaged in Enron accounting,” says Kotlikoff, who recently penned an op-ed for Bloomberg entitled: The U.S. Is Bankrupt and We Don't Even Know It.
Yet, the debt market continues to have an insatiable appetite for U.S. Treasuries; heading into Monday's session, the yield on the 30-year Treasury bond (which moves in opposition to its price) was at its lowest level since April 2009.
Kotlikoff says that's because the market is focused on the "mole hill" of official debt. In time, the U.S. will have a major inflation problem to rival that of Germany's post World War I Weimar Republic, he predicts. “We have to think about the fact that unless the government gets its fiscal act in order we’re going to have the government printing lots and lots money to pay these enormous bills that are coming due over time.”
America is in need of major reform of the health-care, retirement, tax and financial system, Kotlikoff continues. “We need (to perform) heart surgery on this economy, not putting on more band-aids which is what we’ve been doing.”
Barring that, your hard-earned dollars will soon be worthless, he declares.
Posted Aug 23, 2010 07:30am
By Peter Gorenstein in Investing, Recession, Politics
Yahoo Finance
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) forecasts the U.S. budget deficit will hit $1.3 trillion this year. An astronomical figure, to be sure, but that’s lower than was projected in March. It’s also less than last year’s record $1.41 trillion deficit, which was close to 10% of GDP.
And, that's the good news.
As the deficit grows so does the national debt, which is currently more than $13.3 trillion, according to official figures.
But the situation is actually much, much worse, according to Boston University economics professor Laurence Kotlikoff.
“Forget the official debt,” he tells Aaron in this clip. The “real” deficit - including non-budgetary items like unfunded liabilities of Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security and the defense budget - is actually $202 trillion, the professor and author calculates; or 15 times the “official" numbers.
“Congress has engaged in Enron accounting,” says Kotlikoff, who recently penned an op-ed for Bloomberg entitled: The U.S. Is Bankrupt and We Don't Even Know It.
Yet, the debt market continues to have an insatiable appetite for U.S. Treasuries; heading into Monday's session, the yield on the 30-year Treasury bond (which moves in opposition to its price) was at its lowest level since April 2009.
Kotlikoff says that's because the market is focused on the "mole hill" of official debt. In time, the U.S. will have a major inflation problem to rival that of Germany's post World War I Weimar Republic, he predicts. “We have to think about the fact that unless the government gets its fiscal act in order we’re going to have the government printing lots and lots money to pay these enormous bills that are coming due over time.”
America is in need of major reform of the health-care, retirement, tax and financial system, Kotlikoff continues. “We need (to perform) heart surgery on this economy, not putting on more band-aids which is what we’ve been doing.”
Barring that, your hard-earned dollars will soon be worthless, he declares.
3. Bringing Israel's Bomb Out of the Basement
Bringing Israel's Bomb Out of the Basement
By AVNER COHEN and MARVIN MILLER
The New York Times
Published: August 25, 2010
In the shadow of the Holocaust, Israel made a determined and ultimately successful effort to acquire nuclear weapons. Just as fear of genocide is the key to understanding Israel’s nuclear resolve, that fear has also encouraged nuclear restraint. After all, if Israel’s enemies also acquired the bomb, the small Jewish state might well face destruction. Moreover, the specter of killing large numbers of innocent people was morally unsettling.
This combination of resolve and restraint led to a nuclear posture known as opacity, which is fundamentally different from that of all other nuclear weapons states. Israel neither affirms nor denies its possession of nuclear weapons; indeed, the government refuses to say anything factual about its nuclear activities, and Israeli citizens are encouraged, both by law and by custom, to follow suit.
Opacity was first codified in a secret accord between President Richard Nixon and Prime Minister Golda Meir of Israel in September 1969. As long as Israel did not advertise its possession of nuclear weapons, by either declaring it had them or testing them, the United States agreed to tolerate and shield Israel’s nuclear program. Ever since, all U.S. presidents and Israeli prime ministers have reaffirmed this policy — most recently, President Obama in a July White House meeting with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, during which Mr. Obama stated, “Israel has unique security requirements. ... And the United States will never ask Israel to take any steps that would undermine [its] security interests.”
Opacity continues to have almost universal support among members of the Israeli security establishment, who argue that, by not publicly flaunting its nuclear status, Israel has reduced its neighbors’ incentives to proliferate and has made it easier to resist demands that it give up its nuclear shield before a just and durable peace is established in the Middle East.
But this policy has now become anachronistic, even counterproductive. In the early days of its nuclear program, Israel had no concerns about legitimacy, recognition and responsibility; its focus was acquiring a nuclear capability. Today, the situation is different. Israel is now a mature nuclear weapons state, but it finds it difficult under the strictures of opacity to make a convincing case that it is a responsible one. To the extent that opacity shields Israel’s nuclear capabilities and intentions, it also undercuts the need for its citizens to be informed about issues that are literally matters of life and death, such as: Whose finger is on the nuclear trigger and under what circumstances would nuclear weapons be used?
Opacity also prevents Israel from making a convincing case that its nuclear policy is indeed one of defensive last resort and from participating in a meaningful fashion in regional arms control and global disarmament deliberations.
Israel needs to recognize, moreover, that the Middle East peace process is linked to the issue of nuclear weapons in the region. International support for Israel and its opaque bomb is being increasingly eroded by its continued occupation of Palestinian territory and the policies that support that occupation. Such criticism of these policies might well spill over into the nuclear domain, making Israel vulnerable to the charge that it is a nuclear-armed pariah state, and thus associating it to an uncomfortable degree with today’s rogue Iranian regime.
Indeed, while almost all states publicly oppose the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran, there is also growing support for dealing with this problem in an “evenhanded” manner, namely, by establishing a nuclear weapons free zone across the entire region.
However, if Israel takes seriously the need to modify its own nuclear posture and its approach to the peace process, there will likely be stronger international support for measures designed to stop Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold and to contain a nuclear-armed Iran if those efforts fail.
Israel was not the first state to acquire nuclear weapons, and given its unique geopolitical concerns, it should not be expected to lead the world into the nuclear-free age. But in order to deal effectively with the new regional nuclear environment and emerging global nuclear norms, Israel must reassess the wisdom of its unwavering commitment to opacity and realize that international support for retaining its military edge, including its military edge, rests on retaining its moral edge.
By AVNER COHEN and MARVIN MILLER
The New York Times
Published: August 25, 2010
In the shadow of the Holocaust, Israel made a determined and ultimately successful effort to acquire nuclear weapons. Just as fear of genocide is the key to understanding Israel’s nuclear resolve, that fear has also encouraged nuclear restraint. After all, if Israel’s enemies also acquired the bomb, the small Jewish state might well face destruction. Moreover, the specter of killing large numbers of innocent people was morally unsettling.
This combination of resolve and restraint led to a nuclear posture known as opacity, which is fundamentally different from that of all other nuclear weapons states. Israel neither affirms nor denies its possession of nuclear weapons; indeed, the government refuses to say anything factual about its nuclear activities, and Israeli citizens are encouraged, both by law and by custom, to follow suit.
Opacity was first codified in a secret accord between President Richard Nixon and Prime Minister Golda Meir of Israel in September 1969. As long as Israel did not advertise its possession of nuclear weapons, by either declaring it had them or testing them, the United States agreed to tolerate and shield Israel’s nuclear program. Ever since, all U.S. presidents and Israeli prime ministers have reaffirmed this policy — most recently, President Obama in a July White House meeting with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, during which Mr. Obama stated, “Israel has unique security requirements. ... And the United States will never ask Israel to take any steps that would undermine [its] security interests.”
Opacity continues to have almost universal support among members of the Israeli security establishment, who argue that, by not publicly flaunting its nuclear status, Israel has reduced its neighbors’ incentives to proliferate and has made it easier to resist demands that it give up its nuclear shield before a just and durable peace is established in the Middle East.
But this policy has now become anachronistic, even counterproductive. In the early days of its nuclear program, Israel had no concerns about legitimacy, recognition and responsibility; its focus was acquiring a nuclear capability. Today, the situation is different. Israel is now a mature nuclear weapons state, but it finds it difficult under the strictures of opacity to make a convincing case that it is a responsible one. To the extent that opacity shields Israel’s nuclear capabilities and intentions, it also undercuts the need for its citizens to be informed about issues that are literally matters of life and death, such as: Whose finger is on the nuclear trigger and under what circumstances would nuclear weapons be used?
Opacity also prevents Israel from making a convincing case that its nuclear policy is indeed one of defensive last resort and from participating in a meaningful fashion in regional arms control and global disarmament deliberations.
Israel needs to recognize, moreover, that the Middle East peace process is linked to the issue of nuclear weapons in the region. International support for Israel and its opaque bomb is being increasingly eroded by its continued occupation of Palestinian territory and the policies that support that occupation. Such criticism of these policies might well spill over into the nuclear domain, making Israel vulnerable to the charge that it is a nuclear-armed pariah state, and thus associating it to an uncomfortable degree with today’s rogue Iranian regime.
Indeed, while almost all states publicly oppose the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran, there is also growing support for dealing with this problem in an “evenhanded” manner, namely, by establishing a nuclear weapons free zone across the entire region.
However, if Israel takes seriously the need to modify its own nuclear posture and its approach to the peace process, there will likely be stronger international support for measures designed to stop Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold and to contain a nuclear-armed Iran if those efforts fail.
Israel was not the first state to acquire nuclear weapons, and given its unique geopolitical concerns, it should not be expected to lead the world into the nuclear-free age. But in order to deal effectively with the new regional nuclear environment and emerging global nuclear norms, Israel must reassess the wisdom of its unwavering commitment to opacity and realize that international support for retaining its military edge, including its military edge, rests on retaining its moral edge.
2. Drought pushes up food prices in Russia
Drought pushes up food prices in Russia
PressTV
Wed Aug 25, 2010 9:12PM
Inflation in Russia was 0.2 percent last week, much higher than the figure before the drought. It is the third week in a row that prices have soared by this degree, the state statistics office announced.
The government said Tuesday that the inflation rate this year would now be higher than the previous estimate of 6.0-7.0 percent due to the drought but would still be lower than the 2009 figure of 8.8 percent.
The price of Russian food staple buckwheat has increased by 8.6 percent in the space of the week. Flour prices rose 3.3 percent in the week, while milk was up 1.3 percent. The price of bread increased 0.9 percent.
Last month, Russia experienced the hottest July ever recorded. The intense heat and drought affecting central Russia dried out trees and peat marshes, which caught fire, burning forests, fields and houses across a massive region.
The wildfires destroyed one quarter of the country's crops and prompted the government to impose a ban on grain exports to protect domestic supplies. The decision has resulted in sharp fluctuations in grain prices in agriculture commodities markets, stirring up fears that another food crisis may be looming.
PressTV
Wed Aug 25, 2010 9:12PM
Inflation in Russia was 0.2 percent last week, much higher than the figure before the drought. It is the third week in a row that prices have soared by this degree, the state statistics office announced.
The government said Tuesday that the inflation rate this year would now be higher than the previous estimate of 6.0-7.0 percent due to the drought but would still be lower than the 2009 figure of 8.8 percent.
The price of Russian food staple buckwheat has increased by 8.6 percent in the space of the week. Flour prices rose 3.3 percent in the week, while milk was up 1.3 percent. The price of bread increased 0.9 percent.
Last month, Russia experienced the hottest July ever recorded. The intense heat and drought affecting central Russia dried out trees and peat marshes, which caught fire, burning forests, fields and houses across a massive region.
The wildfires destroyed one quarter of the country's crops and prompted the government to impose a ban on grain exports to protect domestic supplies. The decision has resulted in sharp fluctuations in grain prices in agriculture commodities markets, stirring up fears that another food crisis may be looming.
1. 'Israel's security US main obsession'
'Israel's security US main obsession'
Wed Aug 25, 2010 7:50PM
Press TV
“The process of peace talks shows that the fate of Palestine has not been the obsession for the West and they have only been seeking to provide security for Israel sometimes through wars and sometimes through peace," Larijani said on Wednesday.
He stated that the US has been leading efforts to support Israel through brokering the peace talks.
Peace talks between Israel and Palestinians stopped in December 2008 after Israel launched a deadly attack on the Gaza Strip.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and acting Palestinian Authority chief Mahmoud Abbas are scheduled to resume direct peace talks in Washington on September 2.
Democratically elected Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh says the Palestinian Authority's decision to resume direct talks with Israel is doomed to fail.
Senior Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal says the upcoming direct talks between the Palestinian Authority and Israel are illegitimate and a result of US coercion.
"These negotiations are taking place by force of coercion and with an American summons," the head of Hamas' political bureau told reporters in the Syrian capital on Tuesday, the Canadian Press news agency reported.
Wed Aug 25, 2010 7:50PM
Press TV
“The process of peace talks shows that the fate of Palestine has not been the obsession for the West and they have only been seeking to provide security for Israel sometimes through wars and sometimes through peace," Larijani said on Wednesday.
He stated that the US has been leading efforts to support Israel through brokering the peace talks.
Peace talks between Israel and Palestinians stopped in December 2008 after Israel launched a deadly attack on the Gaza Strip.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and acting Palestinian Authority chief Mahmoud Abbas are scheduled to resume direct peace talks in Washington on September 2.
Democratically elected Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh says the Palestinian Authority's decision to resume direct talks with Israel is doomed to fail.
Senior Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal says the upcoming direct talks between the Palestinian Authority and Israel are illegitimate and a result of US coercion.
"These negotiations are taking place by force of coercion and with an American summons," the head of Hamas' political bureau told reporters in the Syrian capital on Tuesday, the Canadian Press news agency reported.
55. Japan senior lawmaker: Americans are simple-minded
Japan senior lawmaker: Americans are simple-minded
By The Associated Press
Wednesday, August 25th, 2010 -- 4:38 pm
A key figure in Japan's ruling party dubbed Americans "simple-minded" in a speech to fellow lawmakers Wednesday.
It was not clear what prompted the remarks by Democratic Party heavyweight Ichiro Ozawa at a political seminar, in which he otherwise paid tribute to Americans' commitment to democracy, saying it was something Japan should learn from.
"I like Americans, but they are somewhat monocellular," the former Democratic Party leader said. "When I talk with Americans, I often wonder why they are so simple-minded."
Ozawa didn't elaborate on what aspect of Americans made him compare them monocellular organisms, a term also used to mean shortsighted or dumb.
There is growing speculation that the 68-year-old former party leader — renowned as a backroom dealer and election strategist but unpopular among the wider public — may run against rival Prime Minister Naoto Kan in a Sept. 14 election for the party leadership.
Ozawa steered clear of that topic in his speech at the seminar to about 50 lawmakers from the party and dozens of other invitees. But later Wednesday he hinted he would, telling supporters his decision on whether to run would hopefully "respond to your expectations." He said he needed more time to make that decision.
Ozawa was forced to resign as party secretary-general in early June over a funding scandal, though he has denied any wrongdoing.
Despite the Democratic Party-led government's monthslong tussle with Washington over the planned relocation of a major U.S. military base in Okinawa — which has weakened public support for the government — Tokyo and Washington remain close allies, and Ozawa's comments on Americans did not appear geared at currying support within the party.
Ozawa, who advocates a U.S.-style two-party political system for Japan — which currently has a coalition government — praised Americans for electing President Barack Obama.
"I don't think Americans are very smart, but I give extremely high credit for democracy and choices by its people," he said. "They chose a black president for the first time in U.S. history," adding that he thought once that would never be possible.
By The Associated Press
Wednesday, August 25th, 2010 -- 4:38 pm
A key figure in Japan's ruling party dubbed Americans "simple-minded" in a speech to fellow lawmakers Wednesday.
It was not clear what prompted the remarks by Democratic Party heavyweight Ichiro Ozawa at a political seminar, in which he otherwise paid tribute to Americans' commitment to democracy, saying it was something Japan should learn from.
"I like Americans, but they are somewhat monocellular," the former Democratic Party leader said. "When I talk with Americans, I often wonder why they are so simple-minded."
Ozawa didn't elaborate on what aspect of Americans made him compare them monocellular organisms, a term also used to mean shortsighted or dumb.
There is growing speculation that the 68-year-old former party leader — renowned as a backroom dealer and election strategist but unpopular among the wider public — may run against rival Prime Minister Naoto Kan in a Sept. 14 election for the party leadership.
Ozawa steered clear of that topic in his speech at the seminar to about 50 lawmakers from the party and dozens of other invitees. But later Wednesday he hinted he would, telling supporters his decision on whether to run would hopefully "respond to your expectations." He said he needed more time to make that decision.
Ozawa was forced to resign as party secretary-general in early June over a funding scandal, though he has denied any wrongdoing.
Despite the Democratic Party-led government's monthslong tussle with Washington over the planned relocation of a major U.S. military base in Okinawa — which has weakened public support for the government — Tokyo and Washington remain close allies, and Ozawa's comments on Americans did not appear geared at currying support within the party.
Ozawa, who advocates a U.S.-style two-party political system for Japan — which currently has a coalition government — praised Americans for electing President Barack Obama.
"I don't think Americans are very smart, but I give extremely high credit for democracy and choices by its people," he said. "They chose a black president for the first time in U.S. history," adding that he thought once that would never be possible.
54. Be careful of Japan-S.Korea alliance
Be careful of Japan-S.Korea alliance
Global Times
[02:05 August 24 2010]
While China and South Korea have shown some concern over the US-South Korean military exercises lately, Japan has been extending its hand to its long-time rival, South Korea, this month.
In a formal apology to South Koreans for Japan's colonial rule from 1910 to 1945, Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan also said the two countries share many values, and called for a new Japan-South Korea partnership aimed at dealing with North Korea and an increasingly powerful China, a Kyodo News Agency report on Saturday quoted a government source as saying.
The words immediately sent chills to Chinese people, reminding them of the Cold War era when Northeast Asia was divided by two triangles, the China- Soviet Union-North Korea triangle versus the US-Japan-South Korea triangle - the line of division almost cut off all communication between the two blocs.
However, the fact is, today's Northeast Asia is no longer the one of the past. Russia is no longer the Soviet Union, and China is no longer a closed impoverished land. Instead, China has become the largest trading partner of both Japan and South Korea. About 1 million South Koreans are living in China, and more than 10,000 Japanese visit China on a daily basis.
Although history or sovereignty frictions arise from time to time, the three countries have not seriously been involved in a strategic confrontation for a long time.
The notion that Japan and South Korea will join hands to confront China and North Korea is an extremely dangerous setback in Northeast Asian relations.
We hope this provocative call is a misunderstanding by the Kyodo News, or perhaps it is only a Japanese government official's singular idea, which is far from becoming real national policy.
But the news does give some insight about the Kan administration's intent to ally with South Korea in the face of an imagined threat from China and North Korea. In reality, the plan is unlikely to work.
One of the reasons for failure would be the two Koreas' inseparable tie that would most likely not stand the strain of interference of their common enemy during WWII.
The three countries rank as Asia's top, second, and fourth largest economies and have long been tied together economically and culturally. It is hard to lose any one of the three, whose GDP together account for 70 percent of Asia's total.
It is not a bad thing for Japan and South Korea to become closer. But the two countries should be clear that they are not able to really contain China.
China, on the other hand, needs to understand the two neighbors' anxiety over its rising power. Only by closer contact with the two countries can China win their trust, and prevent any missteps from misunderstandings.
The Japanese administration may need to learn a simple lesson: Do not make another enemy when trying to befriend a neighbor.
Global Times
[02:05 August 24 2010]
While China and South Korea have shown some concern over the US-South Korean military exercises lately, Japan has been extending its hand to its long-time rival, South Korea, this month.
In a formal apology to South Koreans for Japan's colonial rule from 1910 to 1945, Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan also said the two countries share many values, and called for a new Japan-South Korea partnership aimed at dealing with North Korea and an increasingly powerful China, a Kyodo News Agency report on Saturday quoted a government source as saying.
The words immediately sent chills to Chinese people, reminding them of the Cold War era when Northeast Asia was divided by two triangles, the China- Soviet Union-North Korea triangle versus the US-Japan-South Korea triangle - the line of division almost cut off all communication between the two blocs.
However, the fact is, today's Northeast Asia is no longer the one of the past. Russia is no longer the Soviet Union, and China is no longer a closed impoverished land. Instead, China has become the largest trading partner of both Japan and South Korea. About 1 million South Koreans are living in China, and more than 10,000 Japanese visit China on a daily basis.
Although history or sovereignty frictions arise from time to time, the three countries have not seriously been involved in a strategic confrontation for a long time.
The notion that Japan and South Korea will join hands to confront China and North Korea is an extremely dangerous setback in Northeast Asian relations.
We hope this provocative call is a misunderstanding by the Kyodo News, or perhaps it is only a Japanese government official's singular idea, which is far from becoming real national policy.
But the news does give some insight about the Kan administration's intent to ally with South Korea in the face of an imagined threat from China and North Korea. In reality, the plan is unlikely to work.
One of the reasons for failure would be the two Koreas' inseparable tie that would most likely not stand the strain of interference of their common enemy during WWII.
The three countries rank as Asia's top, second, and fourth largest economies and have long been tied together economically and culturally. It is hard to lose any one of the three, whose GDP together account for 70 percent of Asia's total.
It is not a bad thing for Japan and South Korea to become closer. But the two countries should be clear that they are not able to really contain China.
China, on the other hand, needs to understand the two neighbors' anxiety over its rising power. Only by closer contact with the two countries can China win their trust, and prevent any missteps from misunderstandings.
The Japanese administration may need to learn a simple lesson: Do not make another enemy when trying to befriend a neighbor.
53. China becomes hydro superpower, but aims for greater capacity
China becomes hydro superpower, but aims for greater capacity
People's Daily Online
21:06, August 25, 2010
As all generating units began running Wednesday at Xiaowan Hydropower Station in the southwestern Yunnan Province, China's hydropower capacity became the world's largest.
The new 700,000 kilowatt-unit at Xiaowan sent China's installed hydropower capacity just above 200 million kilowatts and marked the completion of the 4.2 million-kilowatt Xiaowan Hydropower Station project, China's second largest hydropower project after the Three Gorges.
With a total investment of 40 billion yuan (5.86 billion U.S. dollars), Xiaowan can produce 19 billion kWh of electricity every year.
At a ceremony at the station, Liu Qi, deputy director of the National Energy Administration (NEA), hailed it as "a great leap forward" for China's hydropower industry after a century of development.
China's first hydropower station, Shilongba Power Station, was built near Kunming, provincial capital of Yunnan, 100 years ago.
"The rapid development of the hydropower industry is of great significance to optimizing China's energy structure and reducing carbon emissions," Sun Yucai, executive vice chairman of the China Electricity Council, said at the ceremony.
The government promised at the Copenhagen Conference on global climate change last year that China would cut its carbon emissions per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) by 40 to 45 percent by 2020.
China also undertook a commitment to generate 15 percent of its power from non-fossil sources by 2020, up from the current 7.8 percent.
As the most competitive non-fossil energy, hydropower was key for China to realize its emissions reduction goal, Sun said.
China has long relied on coal to fuel its economic growth with about 83 percent of its electricity produced by coal-fired stations, according to the NEA.
To match the installed hydropower capacity of 200 million kilowatts, thermal power plants would have to burn 288 million tonnes of coal equivalent, emit 855 million tonnes of carbon dioxide and 5.4 million tonnes of carbon sulfur dioxide every year, according to China Electricity Council estimates.
Zhang Guobao, director of the NEA, told Xinhua Wednesday that hydro projects with another 70 million kilowatts capacity were under construction, and another 100 million kilowatts of capacity was needed.
"If all the planned hydropower projects begin construction in the next three years, it is still possible to expand the current installed hydropower capacity to 380 million kilowatts by 2020," Zhang said.
"We need careful and detailed planning and imperative approval procedures," he said.
In a separate interview with web portal Sina.com Wednesday, Zhang said China would expand its installed hydropower capacity to 300 million kilowatts by 2015 in an effort to cut carbon emissions.
Source:Xinhua
People's Daily Online
21:06, August 25, 2010
As all generating units began running Wednesday at Xiaowan Hydropower Station in the southwestern Yunnan Province, China's hydropower capacity became the world's largest.
The new 700,000 kilowatt-unit at Xiaowan sent China's installed hydropower capacity just above 200 million kilowatts and marked the completion of the 4.2 million-kilowatt Xiaowan Hydropower Station project, China's second largest hydropower project after the Three Gorges.
With a total investment of 40 billion yuan (5.86 billion U.S. dollars), Xiaowan can produce 19 billion kWh of electricity every year.
At a ceremony at the station, Liu Qi, deputy director of the National Energy Administration (NEA), hailed it as "a great leap forward" for China's hydropower industry after a century of development.
China's first hydropower station, Shilongba Power Station, was built near Kunming, provincial capital of Yunnan, 100 years ago.
"The rapid development of the hydropower industry is of great significance to optimizing China's energy structure and reducing carbon emissions," Sun Yucai, executive vice chairman of the China Electricity Council, said at the ceremony.
The government promised at the Copenhagen Conference on global climate change last year that China would cut its carbon emissions per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) by 40 to 45 percent by 2020.
China also undertook a commitment to generate 15 percent of its power from non-fossil sources by 2020, up from the current 7.8 percent.
As the most competitive non-fossil energy, hydropower was key for China to realize its emissions reduction goal, Sun said.
China has long relied on coal to fuel its economic growth with about 83 percent of its electricity produced by coal-fired stations, according to the NEA.
To match the installed hydropower capacity of 200 million kilowatts, thermal power plants would have to burn 288 million tonnes of coal equivalent, emit 855 million tonnes of carbon dioxide and 5.4 million tonnes of carbon sulfur dioxide every year, according to China Electricity Council estimates.
Zhang Guobao, director of the NEA, told Xinhua Wednesday that hydro projects with another 70 million kilowatts capacity were under construction, and another 100 million kilowatts of capacity was needed.
"If all the planned hydropower projects begin construction in the next three years, it is still possible to expand the current installed hydropower capacity to 380 million kilowatts by 2020," Zhang said.
"We need careful and detailed planning and imperative approval procedures," he said.
In a separate interview with web portal Sina.com Wednesday, Zhang said China would expand its installed hydropower capacity to 300 million kilowatts by 2015 in an effort to cut carbon emissions.
Source:Xinhua
52. US-S.Korea drill aimed at fall of North
US-S.Korea drill aimed at fall of North
People's Daily
08:28, August 26, 2010
Signs of the ongoing US-South Korea military drill show that the joint war game is not simply a warning or a show of force after the sinking of the Cheonan, nor is it a deliberate attempt to provoke China in the Yellow Sea.
China has to be careful of the two allies' strategic goal, which is to create turmoil in North Korea in the face of a pending political power transition.
China must also be wary of the US putting the entire Korean Peninsula under its influence.
The two Koreas have been deadlocked for nearly six decades. Not many people believe the situation can last forever.
Any change will mean a massive strategic change of power in Northeast Asia, as well as a change in the global balance of power.
Washington has made plans in the event of various scenarios, and has long been trying to push the situation in the direction that favors a US global strategy.
To put it simply, the US has never changed its basic policy toward North Korea, which is to ensue a regime change.
Although Washington is not openly talking about the policy, its goal remains to overthrow the current North Korean government.
The US-South Korean joint military exercises are a move to accelerate this momentum. It is a strategy to push and prepare for change, and take the initiative if the regime change really happens.
The controversial sinking of the South Korean battleship, in retrospect, is more like a convenient excuse for the US to conduct a long-planned drill that envisions the occupation of the North, rather than a single reaction toward an emergency.
US military leaders have been drawing up such plans since the end of last year.
The South's unification ministry has also admitted that the South was practicing a "stabilization" program aimed at turning North Koreans into South Korean citizens.
The Korean Peninsula is too important to ignore in the realm of global geopolitics. US control of the peninsula will pose a realistic threat to China and Russia.
North Korean leadership is expected to change hands soon. The world is watching the change closely, as North Korea is still not back to the Six-Party Talks that aim to persuade it to drop its nuclear weapon program.
A smooth transition of power in the North is vital for the stability of Northeast Asia.
China needs to clearly realize this, and try to play an active role in preserving the peace on the Korean Peninsula, as well as look after its own interests
People's Daily
08:28, August 26, 2010
Signs of the ongoing US-South Korea military drill show that the joint war game is not simply a warning or a show of force after the sinking of the Cheonan, nor is it a deliberate attempt to provoke China in the Yellow Sea.
China has to be careful of the two allies' strategic goal, which is to create turmoil in North Korea in the face of a pending political power transition.
China must also be wary of the US putting the entire Korean Peninsula under its influence.
The two Koreas have been deadlocked for nearly six decades. Not many people believe the situation can last forever.
Any change will mean a massive strategic change of power in Northeast Asia, as well as a change in the global balance of power.
Washington has made plans in the event of various scenarios, and has long been trying to push the situation in the direction that favors a US global strategy.
To put it simply, the US has never changed its basic policy toward North Korea, which is to ensue a regime change.
Although Washington is not openly talking about the policy, its goal remains to overthrow the current North Korean government.
The US-South Korean joint military exercises are a move to accelerate this momentum. It is a strategy to push and prepare for change, and take the initiative if the regime change really happens.
The controversial sinking of the South Korean battleship, in retrospect, is more like a convenient excuse for the US to conduct a long-planned drill that envisions the occupation of the North, rather than a single reaction toward an emergency.
US military leaders have been drawing up such plans since the end of last year.
The South's unification ministry has also admitted that the South was practicing a "stabilization" program aimed at turning North Koreans into South Korean citizens.
The Korean Peninsula is too important to ignore in the realm of global geopolitics. US control of the peninsula will pose a realistic threat to China and Russia.
North Korean leadership is expected to change hands soon. The world is watching the change closely, as North Korea is still not back to the Six-Party Talks that aim to persuade it to drop its nuclear weapon program.
A smooth transition of power in the North is vital for the stability of Northeast Asia.
China needs to clearly realize this, and try to play an active role in preserving the peace on the Korean Peninsula, as well as look after its own interests
51. South Africa, China: The Limits of Cooperation
South Africa, China: The Limits of Cooperation
Stratfor
August 24, 2010
2128 GMT
Summary
South Africa and China signed a “comprehensive strategic partnership” during President Jacob Zuma’s visit to Beijing, part of a wider effort to increase economic cooperation with other emerging economic powers and increase Pretoria’s standing as a global geopolitical actor. While such partnerships can help bring much needed investment and technical expertise into the country, South Africa’s domestic challenges, such as unemployment, public sector strikes and widespread poverty, will need to be addressed before it can credibly rise as a regional power with global influence, and some of the potential partnerships with China could even exacerbate existing problems.
Analysis
South African President Jacob Zuma announced a “comprehensive strategic partnership” with China on Aug. 24 during his three-day state visit to the country. Pretoria is courting China and the other BRIC countries — Brazil, Russia and India, all of which Zuma has recently visited — as a way to position itself not merely as a leading emerging economy but as a global geopolitical actor representing a developing region.
Since the end of apartheid in 1994, South Africa has been focused on internal reconciliation, including efforts to avoid capital flight, mass emigration of the white elite, and the possibility of a protracted civil war. It is only since Zuma’s 2009 election that South Africa has emerged from this inward focus. The BRIC countries, foremost among them China, have a great deal of technical expertise and investment capital they can offer Pretoria and that Pretoria intends to seek. However, a number of domestic challenges, including labor disputes, unemployment and poverty, must be addressed before South Africa is able to lay claim to its regional and global ambitions, and some of the potential avenues for cooperation with China may even exacerbate these problems if pursued.
The BRIC countries are a loose confederation often viewed in terms of their rapidly growing economies, but more significant, recognized for their regional and global political influence. Likewise, South Africa has long seen itself as not only the natural leader of Africa, but also as a country that should spread its influence globally. During the Cold War, South Africa positioned itself essentially as a Western European ally that happened to be in Africa, acting as a bulwark against Communist expansion on the continent (especially in the southern African region) and as a crucial source of natural resources, as well as informally monitoring military activity in the South Atlantic for NATO.
Reaching out to the BRIC countries is one way for the South Africans to acquire the investment and other skill sets they seek, such as Brazilian energy technology, Russian mining technology, Indian information technology and Chinese capital. The Chinese are already South Africa’s largest trading partner both in terms of exports and imports. Recent Chinese deals in South Africa have included major mining and banking sector investments, and during Zuma’s ongoing visit, a railway infrastructure deal was discussed and a telecommunications deal was signed.
These will be necessary inputs to help South Africa boost its global footprint but by themselves will not overcome domestic and regional constraints facing Pretoria. While a strategic partnership with China may facilitate heavy investment, and Beijing may speak up for South Africa on global interests held in common, Beijing’s primary interests are obtaining natural resources and providing major infrastructure projects for its state-owned companies. It is not interested in helping South Africa in intra-regional spats with other African countries in which China also holds economic interests. For example, Angola, which is attempting to emerge as a rival to Pretoria for African leadership, is now China’s largest crude supplier, and Zimbabwe is home to a number of Chinese mines; China would not want to risk alienating these trade partners. Brazil is also unlikely to jeopardize its growing relationship with Angola, with which it hopes to jointly explore for ultra-deep crude oil in the Atlantic Basin stretching between the two countries.
At home, Pretoria will be careful to manage its burgeoning BRIC dealings so as to not upset its relations, particularly with its labor allies, the Congress of South African Trade Unions. Currently embroiled in a public sector strike over a pay and working condition dispute involving at least 1 million workers, the Zuma government cannot afford a deepening of unemployment (the official unemployment rate is 25 percent, while unofficially the rate is believed to be closer to 40 percent). In addition, China often sends Chinese workers abroad with its investment capital to work on joint infrastructure projects. This potential influx of Chinese laborers displacing their South African counterparts, as has been the case elsewhere in Africa, would compound Pretoria’s existing employment problems. South Africa has recently dealt with violent threats against Zimbabwean and Somali immigrants perceived to be stealing South African jobs and absorbing what limited supply of social services there are in South Africa, and anti-Chinese violence could also take hold.
Globally, Pretoria has positioned itself for a stronger international role, and it is taking incremental steps to achieve this — aligning with BRIC countries, representing Africa at G-8 and G-20 summits, and aiming for a non-permanent seat starting in 2011 on the U.N. Security Council (and perhaps using that seat to eventually petition for permanent council membership).
These efforts are not without significance, and the prospect of increased economic cooperation, investment and strategic partnership with China, however it manifests itself, hold promise for Pretoria. However, until South Africa makes headway on some of its fundamental economic challenges, its ability to join the BRIC countries as a player on the global stage will be constrained.
Stratfor
August 24, 2010
2128 GMT
Summary
South Africa and China signed a “comprehensive strategic partnership” during President Jacob Zuma’s visit to Beijing, part of a wider effort to increase economic cooperation with other emerging economic powers and increase Pretoria’s standing as a global geopolitical actor. While such partnerships can help bring much needed investment and technical expertise into the country, South Africa’s domestic challenges, such as unemployment, public sector strikes and widespread poverty, will need to be addressed before it can credibly rise as a regional power with global influence, and some of the potential partnerships with China could even exacerbate existing problems.
Analysis
South African President Jacob Zuma announced a “comprehensive strategic partnership” with China on Aug. 24 during his three-day state visit to the country. Pretoria is courting China and the other BRIC countries — Brazil, Russia and India, all of which Zuma has recently visited — as a way to position itself not merely as a leading emerging economy but as a global geopolitical actor representing a developing region.
Since the end of apartheid in 1994, South Africa has been focused on internal reconciliation, including efforts to avoid capital flight, mass emigration of the white elite, and the possibility of a protracted civil war. It is only since Zuma’s 2009 election that South Africa has emerged from this inward focus. The BRIC countries, foremost among them China, have a great deal of technical expertise and investment capital they can offer Pretoria and that Pretoria intends to seek. However, a number of domestic challenges, including labor disputes, unemployment and poverty, must be addressed before South Africa is able to lay claim to its regional and global ambitions, and some of the potential avenues for cooperation with China may even exacerbate these problems if pursued.
The BRIC countries are a loose confederation often viewed in terms of their rapidly growing economies, but more significant, recognized for their regional and global political influence. Likewise, South Africa has long seen itself as not only the natural leader of Africa, but also as a country that should spread its influence globally. During the Cold War, South Africa positioned itself essentially as a Western European ally that happened to be in Africa, acting as a bulwark against Communist expansion on the continent (especially in the southern African region) and as a crucial source of natural resources, as well as informally monitoring military activity in the South Atlantic for NATO.
Reaching out to the BRIC countries is one way for the South Africans to acquire the investment and other skill sets they seek, such as Brazilian energy technology, Russian mining technology, Indian information technology and Chinese capital. The Chinese are already South Africa’s largest trading partner both in terms of exports and imports. Recent Chinese deals in South Africa have included major mining and banking sector investments, and during Zuma’s ongoing visit, a railway infrastructure deal was discussed and a telecommunications deal was signed.
These will be necessary inputs to help South Africa boost its global footprint but by themselves will not overcome domestic and regional constraints facing Pretoria. While a strategic partnership with China may facilitate heavy investment, and Beijing may speak up for South Africa on global interests held in common, Beijing’s primary interests are obtaining natural resources and providing major infrastructure projects for its state-owned companies. It is not interested in helping South Africa in intra-regional spats with other African countries in which China also holds economic interests. For example, Angola, which is attempting to emerge as a rival to Pretoria for African leadership, is now China’s largest crude supplier, and Zimbabwe is home to a number of Chinese mines; China would not want to risk alienating these trade partners. Brazil is also unlikely to jeopardize its growing relationship with Angola, with which it hopes to jointly explore for ultra-deep crude oil in the Atlantic Basin stretching between the two countries.
At home, Pretoria will be careful to manage its burgeoning BRIC dealings so as to not upset its relations, particularly with its labor allies, the Congress of South African Trade Unions. Currently embroiled in a public sector strike over a pay and working condition dispute involving at least 1 million workers, the Zuma government cannot afford a deepening of unemployment (the official unemployment rate is 25 percent, while unofficially the rate is believed to be closer to 40 percent). In addition, China often sends Chinese workers abroad with its investment capital to work on joint infrastructure projects. This potential influx of Chinese laborers displacing their South African counterparts, as has been the case elsewhere in Africa, would compound Pretoria’s existing employment problems. South Africa has recently dealt with violent threats against Zimbabwean and Somali immigrants perceived to be stealing South African jobs and absorbing what limited supply of social services there are in South Africa, and anti-Chinese violence could also take hold.
Globally, Pretoria has positioned itself for a stronger international role, and it is taking incremental steps to achieve this — aligning with BRIC countries, representing Africa at G-8 and G-20 summits, and aiming for a non-permanent seat starting in 2011 on the U.N. Security Council (and perhaps using that seat to eventually petition for permanent council membership).
These efforts are not without significance, and the prospect of increased economic cooperation, investment and strategic partnership with China, however it manifests itself, hold promise for Pretoria. However, until South Africa makes headway on some of its fundamental economic challenges, its ability to join the BRIC countries as a player on the global stage will be constrained.
50. Wall St. Helped to Mask Debt Fueling Europe’s Crisis
Wall St. Helped to Mask Debt Fueling Europe’s Crisis
By LOUISE STORY, LANDON THOMAS Jr. and NELSON D. SCHWARTZ
The New York Times
Published: February 13, 2010
Wall Street tactics akin to the ones that fostered subprime mortgages in America have worsened the financial crisis shaking Greece and undermining the euro by enabling European governments to hide their mounting debts.
Gary D. Cohn, president of Goldman Sachs, went to Athens to pitch complex products to defer debt. Such deals let Greece continue deficit spending, like a consumer with a second mortgage.
As worries over Greece rattle world markets, records and interviews show that with Wall Street’s help, the nation engaged in a decade-long effort to skirt European debt limits. One deal created by Goldman Sachs helped obscure billions in debt from the budget overseers in Brussels.
Even as the crisis was nearing the flashpoint, banks were searching for ways to help Greece forestall the day of reckoning. In early November — three months before Athens became the epicenter of global financial anxiety — a team from Goldman Sachs arrived in the ancient city with a very modern proposition for a government struggling to pay its bills, according to two people who were briefed on the meeting.
The bankers, led by Goldman’s president, Gary D. Cohn, held out a financing instrument that would have pushed debt from Greece’s health care system far into the future, much as when strapped homeowners take out second mortgages to pay off their credit cards.
It had worked before. In 2001, just after Greece was admitted to Europe’s monetary union, Goldman helped the government quietly borrow billions, people familiar with the transaction said. That deal, hidden from public view because it was treated as a currency trade rather than a loan, helped Athens to meet Europe’s deficit rules while continuing to spend beyond its means.
Athens did not pursue the latest Goldman proposal, but with Greece groaning under the weight of its debts and with its richer neighbors vowing to come to its aid, the deals over the last decade are raising questions about Wall Street’s role in the world’s latest financial drama.
As in the American subprime crisis and the implosion of the American International Group, financial derivatives played a role in the run-up of Greek debt. Instruments developed by Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase and a wide range of other banks enabled politicians to mask additional borrowing in Greece, Italy and possibly elsewhere.
In dozens of deals across the Continent, banks provided cash upfront in return for government payments in the future, with those liabilities then left off the books. Greece, for example, traded away the rights to airport fees and lottery proceeds in years to come.
Critics say that such deals, because they are not recorded as loans, mislead investors and regulators about the depth of a country’s liabilities.
Some of the Greek deals were named after figures in Greek mythology. One of them, for instance, was called Aeolos, after the god of the winds.
The crisis in Greece poses the most significant challenge yet to Europe’s common currency, the euro, and the Continent’s goal of economic unity. The country is, in the argot of banking, too big to be allowed to fail. Greece owes the world $300 billion, and major banks are on the hook for much of that debt. A default would reverberate around the globe.
A spokeswoman for the Greek finance ministry said the government had met with many banks in recent months and had not committed to any bank’s offers. All debt financings “are conducted in an effort of transparency,” she said. Goldman and JPMorgan declined to comment.
While Wall Street’s handiwork in Europe has received little attention on this side of the Atlantic, it has been sharply criticized in Greece and in magazines like Der Spiegel in Germany.
“Politicians want to pass the ball forward, and if a banker can show them a way to pass a problem to the future, they will fall for it,” said Gikas A. Hardouvelis, an economist and former government official who helped write a recent report on Greece’s accounting policies.
Wall Street did not create Europe’s debt problem. But bankers enabled Greece and others to borrow beyond their means, in deals that were perfectly legal. Few rules govern how nations can borrow the money they need for expenses like the military and health care. The market for sovereign debt — the Wall Street term for loans to governments — is as unfettered as it is vast.
“If a government wants to cheat, it can cheat,” said Garry Schinasi, a veteran of the International Monetary Fund’s capital markets surveillance unit, which monitors vulnerability in global capital markets.
Banks eagerly exploited what was, for them, a highly lucrative symbiosis with free-spending governments. While Greece did not take advantage of Goldman’s proposal in November 2009, it had paid the bank about $300 million in fees for arranging the 2001 transaction, according to several bankers familiar with the deal.
By LOUISE STORY, LANDON THOMAS Jr. and NELSON D. SCHWARTZ
The New York Times
Published: February 13, 2010
Wall Street tactics akin to the ones that fostered subprime mortgages in America have worsened the financial crisis shaking Greece and undermining the euro by enabling European governments to hide their mounting debts.
Gary D. Cohn, president of Goldman Sachs, went to Athens to pitch complex products to defer debt. Such deals let Greece continue deficit spending, like a consumer with a second mortgage.
As worries over Greece rattle world markets, records and interviews show that with Wall Street’s help, the nation engaged in a decade-long effort to skirt European debt limits. One deal created by Goldman Sachs helped obscure billions in debt from the budget overseers in Brussels.
Even as the crisis was nearing the flashpoint, banks were searching for ways to help Greece forestall the day of reckoning. In early November — three months before Athens became the epicenter of global financial anxiety — a team from Goldman Sachs arrived in the ancient city with a very modern proposition for a government struggling to pay its bills, according to two people who were briefed on the meeting.
The bankers, led by Goldman’s president, Gary D. Cohn, held out a financing instrument that would have pushed debt from Greece’s health care system far into the future, much as when strapped homeowners take out second mortgages to pay off their credit cards.
It had worked before. In 2001, just after Greece was admitted to Europe’s monetary union, Goldman helped the government quietly borrow billions, people familiar with the transaction said. That deal, hidden from public view because it was treated as a currency trade rather than a loan, helped Athens to meet Europe’s deficit rules while continuing to spend beyond its means.
Athens did not pursue the latest Goldman proposal, but with Greece groaning under the weight of its debts and with its richer neighbors vowing to come to its aid, the deals over the last decade are raising questions about Wall Street’s role in the world’s latest financial drama.
As in the American subprime crisis and the implosion of the American International Group, financial derivatives played a role in the run-up of Greek debt. Instruments developed by Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase and a wide range of other banks enabled politicians to mask additional borrowing in Greece, Italy and possibly elsewhere.
In dozens of deals across the Continent, banks provided cash upfront in return for government payments in the future, with those liabilities then left off the books. Greece, for example, traded away the rights to airport fees and lottery proceeds in years to come.
Critics say that such deals, because they are not recorded as loans, mislead investors and regulators about the depth of a country’s liabilities.
Some of the Greek deals were named after figures in Greek mythology. One of them, for instance, was called Aeolos, after the god of the winds.
The crisis in Greece poses the most significant challenge yet to Europe’s common currency, the euro, and the Continent’s goal of economic unity. The country is, in the argot of banking, too big to be allowed to fail. Greece owes the world $300 billion, and major banks are on the hook for much of that debt. A default would reverberate around the globe.
A spokeswoman for the Greek finance ministry said the government had met with many banks in recent months and had not committed to any bank’s offers. All debt financings “are conducted in an effort of transparency,” she said. Goldman and JPMorgan declined to comment.
While Wall Street’s handiwork in Europe has received little attention on this side of the Atlantic, it has been sharply criticized in Greece and in magazines like Der Spiegel in Germany.
“Politicians want to pass the ball forward, and if a banker can show them a way to pass a problem to the future, they will fall for it,” said Gikas A. Hardouvelis, an economist and former government official who helped write a recent report on Greece’s accounting policies.
Wall Street did not create Europe’s debt problem. But bankers enabled Greece and others to borrow beyond their means, in deals that were perfectly legal. Few rules govern how nations can borrow the money they need for expenses like the military and health care. The market for sovereign debt — the Wall Street term for loans to governments — is as unfettered as it is vast.
“If a government wants to cheat, it can cheat,” said Garry Schinasi, a veteran of the International Monetary Fund’s capital markets surveillance unit, which monitors vulnerability in global capital markets.
Banks eagerly exploited what was, for them, a highly lucrative symbiosis with free-spending governments. While Greece did not take advantage of Goldman’s proposal in November 2009, it had paid the bank about $300 million in fees for arranging the 2001 transaction, according to several bankers familiar with the deal.
49. Una nueva estrategia mundial para las drogas
Una nueva estrategia mundial para las drogas
Pierre Charasse
24 de agosto de 2010
En México, como en muchos países, se abre la posibilidad de un debate sobre la legalización o despenalización de las drogas. Durante décadas, ni siquiera se podían mencionar estas palabras, ahora ya no es un tabú. Las evidencias se imponen: después de más de medio siglo de prohibición mundial, el consumo y la producción de estupefacientes no ha bajado, la violencia y la corrupción alcanzan niveles extraordinarios, la narcoeconomía está floreciendo.
Desde el principio del siglo XX, los países occidentales, liderados por los Estados Unidos, impusieron y generalizaron un régimen internacional de prohibición de las drogas a través de una serie de convenciones internacionales (1961, 1972 y 1988) que establecen normas de derecho penal internacional: tipificación de delitos de producción y tráfico de drogas, lavado de dinero. Todos los países tuvieron que adaptar su derecho penal nacional a la norma internacional para reprimir el uso de los estupefacientes identificados por las Naciones Unidas. Las listas de las drogas y sustancias prohibidas y de sus precursores químicos están establecidas por expertos de la Junta Internacional de Fiscalización de Estupefacientes (JIFE). Están en constante evolución por la aparición de nuevas moléculas de drogas sintéticas. Los convenios internacionales dejan un pequeño espacio para el uso tradicional o medicinal de estupefacientes de origen vegetal.
Con un balance tan negativo de medio siglo de políticas represivas, se siente la necesidad de abrir un debate sobre estas políticas y sus fundamentos. Se parte de una afirmación: las drogas son peligrosas y socialmente malas. Pero, en toda la historia de la humanidad, en todos los continentes, el hombre utilizó por un motivo o otro (curación, magia, religión, placer…) sustancias que tienen efectos sobre sus facultades físicas o mentales. Algunas pueden ser muy peligrosas, otras no, lo importante es que la absorción de estupefacientes depende de comportamientos individuales o colectivos y plantea la cuestión de las libertades fundamentales del hombre. La prohibición generalizada en el siglo XX responde, sobre todo, a posturas puritanas de la sociedad anglosajona, y se volvió norma universal. La prohibición del alcohol en los Estados Unidos fue un fracaso, nunca resolvió el problema del alcoholismo y provocó grandes daños sociales: violencia, corrupción. No duró mucho.
A pesar de resultados muy discutibles, la mayoría de los gobiernos no se atreve a modificar el régimen actual de prohibición. Es cierto que no se sabe con exactitud qué pasará si se liberalizan la producción y el comercio de los estupefacientes. Pero tenemos indicios. Holanda y Suiza, que permitieron, en cierta medida, el libre comercio de drogas “ligeras”, u otros, que abrieron centros de atención a adictos a drogas “duras”, no se arrepienten: el consumo no ha aumentado, hay mayor control de calidad de los productos, se limitan los riesgos de propagación del VIH o de hepatitis por jeringas contaminadas, el adicto no se siente marginado ni tratado como delincuente sino como enfermo, hay menos violencia. Sacar el uso y el comercio de las drogas, de la clandestinidad, presenta más ventajas que inconvenientes.
Es hora de abrir un debate internacional. El lugar natural para discutir es la Comisión de Estupefacientes de las Naciones Unidas, donde gobiernos y expertos podrán intercambiar sus argumentos sobre la prohibición y, si hay consenso, modificar las convenciones internacionales en vigor. Una fórmula sería dejar a cada país la libertad de reglamentar el uso y el comercio de los diferentes tipos de drogas, como lo hacen para el tabaco, el alcohol o algunos medicamentos. Así se podrían privilegiar medidas de prevención y de salud pública. Sería muy oportuno que un grupo de países, duramente afectados por las consecuencias del narcotráfico como los países andinos, México, Centroamérica y otros, pudieran tomar una iniciativa en las Naciones Unidas para lanzar el debate. La oposición más fuerte al diálogo está en Washington —¿por qué será?—, pero si se suman muchos países, se puede llegar a un consenso para cambiar de estrategia, poniendo énfasis sobre la dimensión sanitaria del problema.
Se agotó el modelo prohibicionista. El inmovilismo actual de la comunidad internacional no puede durar más: la discusión tiene que ser abierta sin a priori, con base en hechos, y no en posturas moralistas que las sociedades ya no aceptan.
Ex embajador de Francia y vicepresidente del Observatoire Géopolitique des Criminalités
Pierre Charasse
24 de agosto de 2010
En México, como en muchos países, se abre la posibilidad de un debate sobre la legalización o despenalización de las drogas. Durante décadas, ni siquiera se podían mencionar estas palabras, ahora ya no es un tabú. Las evidencias se imponen: después de más de medio siglo de prohibición mundial, el consumo y la producción de estupefacientes no ha bajado, la violencia y la corrupción alcanzan niveles extraordinarios, la narcoeconomía está floreciendo.
Desde el principio del siglo XX, los países occidentales, liderados por los Estados Unidos, impusieron y generalizaron un régimen internacional de prohibición de las drogas a través de una serie de convenciones internacionales (1961, 1972 y 1988) que establecen normas de derecho penal internacional: tipificación de delitos de producción y tráfico de drogas, lavado de dinero. Todos los países tuvieron que adaptar su derecho penal nacional a la norma internacional para reprimir el uso de los estupefacientes identificados por las Naciones Unidas. Las listas de las drogas y sustancias prohibidas y de sus precursores químicos están establecidas por expertos de la Junta Internacional de Fiscalización de Estupefacientes (JIFE). Están en constante evolución por la aparición de nuevas moléculas de drogas sintéticas. Los convenios internacionales dejan un pequeño espacio para el uso tradicional o medicinal de estupefacientes de origen vegetal.
Con un balance tan negativo de medio siglo de políticas represivas, se siente la necesidad de abrir un debate sobre estas políticas y sus fundamentos. Se parte de una afirmación: las drogas son peligrosas y socialmente malas. Pero, en toda la historia de la humanidad, en todos los continentes, el hombre utilizó por un motivo o otro (curación, magia, religión, placer…) sustancias que tienen efectos sobre sus facultades físicas o mentales. Algunas pueden ser muy peligrosas, otras no, lo importante es que la absorción de estupefacientes depende de comportamientos individuales o colectivos y plantea la cuestión de las libertades fundamentales del hombre. La prohibición generalizada en el siglo XX responde, sobre todo, a posturas puritanas de la sociedad anglosajona, y se volvió norma universal. La prohibición del alcohol en los Estados Unidos fue un fracaso, nunca resolvió el problema del alcoholismo y provocó grandes daños sociales: violencia, corrupción. No duró mucho.
A pesar de resultados muy discutibles, la mayoría de los gobiernos no se atreve a modificar el régimen actual de prohibición. Es cierto que no se sabe con exactitud qué pasará si se liberalizan la producción y el comercio de los estupefacientes. Pero tenemos indicios. Holanda y Suiza, que permitieron, en cierta medida, el libre comercio de drogas “ligeras”, u otros, que abrieron centros de atención a adictos a drogas “duras”, no se arrepienten: el consumo no ha aumentado, hay mayor control de calidad de los productos, se limitan los riesgos de propagación del VIH o de hepatitis por jeringas contaminadas, el adicto no se siente marginado ni tratado como delincuente sino como enfermo, hay menos violencia. Sacar el uso y el comercio de las drogas, de la clandestinidad, presenta más ventajas que inconvenientes.
Es hora de abrir un debate internacional. El lugar natural para discutir es la Comisión de Estupefacientes de las Naciones Unidas, donde gobiernos y expertos podrán intercambiar sus argumentos sobre la prohibición y, si hay consenso, modificar las convenciones internacionales en vigor. Una fórmula sería dejar a cada país la libertad de reglamentar el uso y el comercio de los diferentes tipos de drogas, como lo hacen para el tabaco, el alcohol o algunos medicamentos. Así se podrían privilegiar medidas de prevención y de salud pública. Sería muy oportuno que un grupo de países, duramente afectados por las consecuencias del narcotráfico como los países andinos, México, Centroamérica y otros, pudieran tomar una iniciativa en las Naciones Unidas para lanzar el debate. La oposición más fuerte al diálogo está en Washington —¿por qué será?—, pero si se suman muchos países, se puede llegar a un consenso para cambiar de estrategia, poniendo énfasis sobre la dimensión sanitaria del problema.
Se agotó el modelo prohibicionista. El inmovilismo actual de la comunidad internacional no puede durar más: la discusión tiene que ser abierta sin a priori, con base en hechos, y no en posturas moralistas que las sociedades ya no aceptan.
Ex embajador de Francia y vicepresidente del Observatoire Géopolitique des Criminalités
48. Irán arrancó Bushehr y la israelpatía no atacó
La Jornada
22 de agosto de 2010
Bajo la Lupa
Irán arrancó Bushehr y la israelpatía no atacó
Alfredo Jalife-Rahme
Antecedentes
El israelí-estadunidense John Bolton, clandestino embajador bushiano en la ONU (nunca fue ratificado por el Senado), se pasó sicóticamente la semana entera –previa al 21 de agosto, fecha del arranque de la primera planta nuclear iraní en Bushehr– incitando un bombardeo unilateral israelí (The Jerusalem Post, 17/08/10).
El historiador israelí-británico-estadunidense Bernard Lewis, hoy nonagenario y especialista emérito (sic) del Islam (sic) en Princeton, había apostado a que el 22 de agosto (¡cómo le pesan a la israelpatía estas fechas del 21 y 22 de agosto!) de hace cuatro años (¡súper sic!), el presidente iraní Ahmadinejad lanzaría bombas nucleares, que no posee, contra Israel (The Wall Street Journal, 8/8/06; Bajo la Lupa 13/8/06). ¡La sicosis total!
Ahora Jeffrey Goldberg, reservista del ejército israelí y al mismo tiempo periodista en Estados Unidos, alcanza el punto sin retorno (sic) en The Atlantic Monthly (septiembre 2010), en un kilométrico artículo propagandístico para excitar un bombardeo contra Irán en la primavera, que sería ejecutado unilateralmente por Israel y sin permiso de Obama. ¡Cómo no!
Nos encontramos en una fase de intensa guerra sicológica promovida por los mendaces multimedia occidentales controlados por el sionismo financiero global, según se ha expuesto en recientes documentos secretos del Senado desclasificados por National Archives and Records Administration (Yahoo News, 18/8/10; Russia Today y Antiwar, Grant Smith, 20/8/10).
No es gratuito que en el mismo Estados Unidos, un patético 22 por ciento (Nota: se me hace exagerado) de sus ingenuos televidentes conceda credibilidad a sus televisoras (Encuesta Gallup 2010).
Peor aún: una encuesta de Tel Aviv University Peace Index revela que 56 por ciento de los israelíes judíos (sic) cree que el mundo entero (¡súper sic!) está contra Israel, al unísono de 54 por ciento de judíos (se me hace bajísimo) quienes piensan que “Israel se encuentra solo en la comunidad internacional, según The Jerusalem Post (El mundo entero está contra nosotros, Yoni Cohen, 19/8/10).
Como reza el bello apotegma bíblico: quienes siembran vientos cosechan tempestades. A tal paranoia ha llevado lastimeramente la israelpatía del canciller Avigdor Lieberman, anterior guarura de cabarets, y del ultrasionista Netanyahu, cuyo padre fue íntimo del ucraniano de origen jázaro (judío converso por religión, no por genética, es decir: no semita y de raíz turco-mongol), el muy violento Vladimir Yevgenyevich Jabotinsky, padre del neosionismo.
Hechos
Hoy la noticia no es que la planta civil nuclear de Bushehr –en la costa del suroeste de Irán y su principal puerto en el Golfo Pérsico– haya arrancado con 36 años de retraso, sino que no haya sido atacada impunemente por la israelpatía (ver Bajo la Lupa, 6 y 9/6/10).
Es ya el día 22 en Bushehr, hora de mi escrito en México, y pasó felizmente el umbral del 21 de agosto para ser bombardeada por Israel, como había incitado el superhalcón John Bolton, su séquito de halcones neoconservadores straussianos, y un elevado número de congresistas estadunidenses, muy bien lubricados, que controla el cabildeo israelí de AIPAC (libro El cabildeo israelí y la política exterior de Estados Unidos, John J. Mearsheimer y Stephen W. Walt, 2007).
Bushehr simboliza el juego con fuego nuclear de las grandes potencias con las medianas: iniciada hace 36 años por el régimen del sha, a instancias de Estados Unidos (para contener a la URSS en el Mar Caspio) y asignada a la empresa alemana Siemens, fue abandonada poco profesionalmente (habiendo cobrado 2 mil 500 millones de dólares, sin devolución) con el arribo de la revolución jomeinista en 1979.
Rusia reanudó su construcción en 1998, 19 años más tarde, que no pudo concluir debido a las fuertes presiones de Estados Unidos durante 12 años hasta que Moscú decidió ahora que debía cumplir sus compromisos.
Los multimedia rusos tomaron muy serenos la apertura de Bushehr (RIA Novosti, 21/8/10) –que contó con la presencia in situ de Sergei Kiriyenko, anterior primer ministro y director de Rosatom (la agencia de energía atómica rusa)–, y será operada en forma conjunta por Rusia e Irán durante un periodo de dos a tres años.
Por lo pronto, en dos o tres años, Bushehr difícilmente sería bombardeada por la israelpatía, que no se atreverá a confrontar a una superpotencia nuclear de la talla de Rusia. No es lo mismo asesinar impúdica e impunemente a inermes palestinos y libaneses que a los técnicos rusos.
Es evidente que las otras plantas sin el resguardo ruso corren serio peligro de un bombardeo unilateral de la israelpatía.
Moraleja
Para blindarse de la israelpatía nuclear, Irán debe resguardar sus otras plantas con técnicos rusos, chinos e indios.
Bushehr es de carácter civil y no ha sido afectada por la cuarta ronda de sanciones (las normales y las adicionales de Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea), que se han descarrilado, a juicio de los chinos.
Rusia abastecerá el combustible nuclear a Bushehr y recogerá los desechos, bajo vigilancia de la AIEA. Así que, en teoría, no existe manera para que Irán fabrique desde Bushehr una bomba de plutonio.
En la otra planta de Teherán, donde la república jomeinista inició un programa para enriquecer uranio al 20 por ciento con fines clínicos, Rusia también está dispuesta a suministrar isótopos radiactivos (yodo y molibdeno) para la investigación médica.
Se recuerda que para fabricar una bomba nuclear se requiere un enriquecimiento de uranio mayor al 90 por ciento, con el que visiblemente no cuenta Irán que, a duras penas, ha iniciado con la odisea del enriquecimiento al 20 por ciento.
Mientras en Irán era un festejo nacional (coincidió con el año nuevo persa del Nowruz), la apertura de Bushehr no inmutó al Departamento de Estado estadunidense, que no la considera como una amenaza proliferativa. ¡Vaya!
Una fecha anterior al fatídico día Bolton, Hillary Clinton anunció la reanudación de las negociaciones directas entre el gobierno israelí de la dupla Netanyahu-Lieberman y la Autoridad Nacional Palestina para el 2 de septiembre bajo auspicios de Estados Unidos, mientras la administración Obama daba seguridad al gobierno israelí de que la amenaza (sic) iraní no era inminente, por lo menos en los próximos 11 meses (The New York Times, 20/8/10). Gary Samore, principal asesor de Obama en temas nucleares, asegura que Irán se encuentra mínimamente (sic) a un año de fabricar una bomba atómica.
Conclusión
Lo más relevante, a nuestro juicio, proviene de la declaración de Ahmadinejad al rotativo nipón Yomiuri Shimbun (20/8/10) –editado en un país muy sensible al asunto nuclear–, un día antes del fatídico día Bolton, de que Irán suspendería el enriquecimiento de uranio al 20 por ciento (el punto nodal de todo el contencioso, que no es nada porque se encuentra muy lejos del umbral incandescente del 90 por ciento), si le aseguran el suministro de combustible nuclear, lo cual se empieza a concretar en Bushehr, como habíamos adelantado (Bajo la Lupa, 15/8/10).
Ahmadinejad sentenció que Irán nunca ha iniciado una guerra o deseado poseer una bomba atómica, lo cual es cierto: ¡todo lo contrario de la israelpatía!
Y en esta cacofonía global, ¿dónde quedan el máximo de 400 bombas nucleares clandestinas de la israelpatía que se obstina en no firmar el Tratado de No Proliferación?
22 de agosto de 2010
Bajo la Lupa
Irán arrancó Bushehr y la israelpatía no atacó
Alfredo Jalife-Rahme
Antecedentes
El israelí-estadunidense John Bolton, clandestino embajador bushiano en la ONU (nunca fue ratificado por el Senado), se pasó sicóticamente la semana entera –previa al 21 de agosto, fecha del arranque de la primera planta nuclear iraní en Bushehr– incitando un bombardeo unilateral israelí (The Jerusalem Post, 17/08/10).
El historiador israelí-británico-estadunidense Bernard Lewis, hoy nonagenario y especialista emérito (sic) del Islam (sic) en Princeton, había apostado a que el 22 de agosto (¡cómo le pesan a la israelpatía estas fechas del 21 y 22 de agosto!) de hace cuatro años (¡súper sic!), el presidente iraní Ahmadinejad lanzaría bombas nucleares, que no posee, contra Israel (The Wall Street Journal, 8/8/06; Bajo la Lupa 13/8/06). ¡La sicosis total!
Ahora Jeffrey Goldberg, reservista del ejército israelí y al mismo tiempo periodista en Estados Unidos, alcanza el punto sin retorno (sic) en The Atlantic Monthly (septiembre 2010), en un kilométrico artículo propagandístico para excitar un bombardeo contra Irán en la primavera, que sería ejecutado unilateralmente por Israel y sin permiso de Obama. ¡Cómo no!
Nos encontramos en una fase de intensa guerra sicológica promovida por los mendaces multimedia occidentales controlados por el sionismo financiero global, según se ha expuesto en recientes documentos secretos del Senado desclasificados por National Archives and Records Administration (Yahoo News, 18/8/10; Russia Today y Antiwar, Grant Smith, 20/8/10).
No es gratuito que en el mismo Estados Unidos, un patético 22 por ciento (Nota: se me hace exagerado) de sus ingenuos televidentes conceda credibilidad a sus televisoras (Encuesta Gallup 2010).
Peor aún: una encuesta de Tel Aviv University Peace Index revela que 56 por ciento de los israelíes judíos (sic) cree que el mundo entero (¡súper sic!) está contra Israel, al unísono de 54 por ciento de judíos (se me hace bajísimo) quienes piensan que “Israel se encuentra solo en la comunidad internacional, según The Jerusalem Post (El mundo entero está contra nosotros, Yoni Cohen, 19/8/10).
Como reza el bello apotegma bíblico: quienes siembran vientos cosechan tempestades. A tal paranoia ha llevado lastimeramente la israelpatía del canciller Avigdor Lieberman, anterior guarura de cabarets, y del ultrasionista Netanyahu, cuyo padre fue íntimo del ucraniano de origen jázaro (judío converso por religión, no por genética, es decir: no semita y de raíz turco-mongol), el muy violento Vladimir Yevgenyevich Jabotinsky, padre del neosionismo.
Hechos
Hoy la noticia no es que la planta civil nuclear de Bushehr –en la costa del suroeste de Irán y su principal puerto en el Golfo Pérsico– haya arrancado con 36 años de retraso, sino que no haya sido atacada impunemente por la israelpatía (ver Bajo la Lupa, 6 y 9/6/10).
Es ya el día 22 en Bushehr, hora de mi escrito en México, y pasó felizmente el umbral del 21 de agosto para ser bombardeada por Israel, como había incitado el superhalcón John Bolton, su séquito de halcones neoconservadores straussianos, y un elevado número de congresistas estadunidenses, muy bien lubricados, que controla el cabildeo israelí de AIPAC (libro El cabildeo israelí y la política exterior de Estados Unidos, John J. Mearsheimer y Stephen W. Walt, 2007).
Bushehr simboliza el juego con fuego nuclear de las grandes potencias con las medianas: iniciada hace 36 años por el régimen del sha, a instancias de Estados Unidos (para contener a la URSS en el Mar Caspio) y asignada a la empresa alemana Siemens, fue abandonada poco profesionalmente (habiendo cobrado 2 mil 500 millones de dólares, sin devolución) con el arribo de la revolución jomeinista en 1979.
Rusia reanudó su construcción en 1998, 19 años más tarde, que no pudo concluir debido a las fuertes presiones de Estados Unidos durante 12 años hasta que Moscú decidió ahora que debía cumplir sus compromisos.
Los multimedia rusos tomaron muy serenos la apertura de Bushehr (RIA Novosti, 21/8/10) –que contó con la presencia in situ de Sergei Kiriyenko, anterior primer ministro y director de Rosatom (la agencia de energía atómica rusa)–, y será operada en forma conjunta por Rusia e Irán durante un periodo de dos a tres años.
Por lo pronto, en dos o tres años, Bushehr difícilmente sería bombardeada por la israelpatía, que no se atreverá a confrontar a una superpotencia nuclear de la talla de Rusia. No es lo mismo asesinar impúdica e impunemente a inermes palestinos y libaneses que a los técnicos rusos.
Es evidente que las otras plantas sin el resguardo ruso corren serio peligro de un bombardeo unilateral de la israelpatía.
Moraleja
Para blindarse de la israelpatía nuclear, Irán debe resguardar sus otras plantas con técnicos rusos, chinos e indios.
Bushehr es de carácter civil y no ha sido afectada por la cuarta ronda de sanciones (las normales y las adicionales de Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea), que se han descarrilado, a juicio de los chinos.
Rusia abastecerá el combustible nuclear a Bushehr y recogerá los desechos, bajo vigilancia de la AIEA. Así que, en teoría, no existe manera para que Irán fabrique desde Bushehr una bomba de plutonio.
En la otra planta de Teherán, donde la república jomeinista inició un programa para enriquecer uranio al 20 por ciento con fines clínicos, Rusia también está dispuesta a suministrar isótopos radiactivos (yodo y molibdeno) para la investigación médica.
Se recuerda que para fabricar una bomba nuclear se requiere un enriquecimiento de uranio mayor al 90 por ciento, con el que visiblemente no cuenta Irán que, a duras penas, ha iniciado con la odisea del enriquecimiento al 20 por ciento.
Mientras en Irán era un festejo nacional (coincidió con el año nuevo persa del Nowruz), la apertura de Bushehr no inmutó al Departamento de Estado estadunidense, que no la considera como una amenaza proliferativa. ¡Vaya!
Una fecha anterior al fatídico día Bolton, Hillary Clinton anunció la reanudación de las negociaciones directas entre el gobierno israelí de la dupla Netanyahu-Lieberman y la Autoridad Nacional Palestina para el 2 de septiembre bajo auspicios de Estados Unidos, mientras la administración Obama daba seguridad al gobierno israelí de que la amenaza (sic) iraní no era inminente, por lo menos en los próximos 11 meses (The New York Times, 20/8/10). Gary Samore, principal asesor de Obama en temas nucleares, asegura que Irán se encuentra mínimamente (sic) a un año de fabricar una bomba atómica.
Conclusión
Lo más relevante, a nuestro juicio, proviene de la declaración de Ahmadinejad al rotativo nipón Yomiuri Shimbun (20/8/10) –editado en un país muy sensible al asunto nuclear–, un día antes del fatídico día Bolton, de que Irán suspendería el enriquecimiento de uranio al 20 por ciento (el punto nodal de todo el contencioso, que no es nada porque se encuentra muy lejos del umbral incandescente del 90 por ciento), si le aseguran el suministro de combustible nuclear, lo cual se empieza a concretar en Bushehr, como habíamos adelantado (Bajo la Lupa, 15/8/10).
Ahmadinejad sentenció que Irán nunca ha iniciado una guerra o deseado poseer una bomba atómica, lo cual es cierto: ¡todo lo contrario de la israelpatía!
Y en esta cacofonía global, ¿dónde quedan el máximo de 400 bombas nucleares clandestinas de la israelpatía que se obstina en no firmar el Tratado de No Proliferación?
47. America Won the Cold War But Now Is Turning Into the USSR
America Won the Cold War But Now Is Turning Into the USSR, Gerald Celente Says
Posted Aug 20, 2010 11:05am EDT by Aaron Task in Newsmakers, Politics
There's a lot of talk these days about America being an empire in decline. Gerald Celente, director of the Trends Research Institute, goes a step further, arguing America is following a similar path as the former Soviet Union.
"While the many glaring differences between the two political systems have been exhaustively publicized - especially in the U.S. - the glaring similarities [go] unnoticed," Celente writes in The Trends Journal, which he publishes.
In the accompanying video, Celente describes some of these similarities, including:
A rotten political system: He compares politicians (Democrats and Republicans alike) to "Mafioso" and says campaign contributions are really thinly disguised "bribes and payoffs."
Crony capitalism: Like in the USSR of old, Celente laments that so much of America's wealth (93%) is controlled by such a small group small portion of its population (10%). Owing to that concentration of wealth, the government makes policies designed to reward "the bigs" at the expense of average citizens (see: Bailouts, banks).
Military-industrial complex: The USSR went bankrupt fighting the cold war and Celente fears the U.S. is "squandering its greater but still finite resources on a gargantuan defense budget, fighting unwinnable hot wars and feeding an insatiable military stationed on hundreds of bases worldwide."
As with many observers, Celente thinks America will suffer the same fate in Afghanistan as the USSR, the British Empire, Alexander the Great and all others who've ventured into the "graveyard of empires."
The irony, of course, is that while America defeated Soviet Communism and won the Cold War, perhaps our greatest threat today comes from China and its booming state-controlled economy.
Posted Aug 20, 2010 11:05am EDT by Aaron Task in Newsmakers, Politics
There's a lot of talk these days about America being an empire in decline. Gerald Celente, director of the Trends Research Institute, goes a step further, arguing America is following a similar path as the former Soviet Union.
"While the many glaring differences between the two political systems have been exhaustively publicized - especially in the U.S. - the glaring similarities [go] unnoticed," Celente writes in The Trends Journal, which he publishes.
In the accompanying video, Celente describes some of these similarities, including:
A rotten political system: He compares politicians (Democrats and Republicans alike) to "Mafioso" and says campaign contributions are really thinly disguised "bribes and payoffs."
Crony capitalism: Like in the USSR of old, Celente laments that so much of America's wealth (93%) is controlled by such a small group small portion of its population (10%). Owing to that concentration of wealth, the government makes policies designed to reward "the bigs" at the expense of average citizens (see: Bailouts, banks).
Military-industrial complex: The USSR went bankrupt fighting the cold war and Celente fears the U.S. is "squandering its greater but still finite resources on a gargantuan defense budget, fighting unwinnable hot wars and feeding an insatiable military stationed on hundreds of bases worldwide."
As with many observers, Celente thinks America will suffer the same fate in Afghanistan as the USSR, the British Empire, Alexander the Great and all others who've ventured into the "graveyard of empires."
The irony, of course, is that while America defeated Soviet Communism and won the Cold War, perhaps our greatest threat today comes from China and its booming state-controlled economy.
46. ¿Nueva guerra de Israel contra Líbano por el gas?
¿Nueva guerra de Israel contra Líbano por el gas?
por Alfredo Jalife-Rahme*
9 de agosto de 2010
Red Voltaire
Varios analistas avezados habían detectado que detrás de la guerra de Israel contra Gaza –gobernado por el grupo islámico sunnita Hamas– se encontraban los pletóricos yacimientos de gas en las costas palestinas del Mar Mediterráneo.
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Pese a su dotación de un máximo de 400 bombas nucleares y de la mejor aviación de todo el Medio Oriente –ya no se puede aseverar que posea el mejor ejército de la región después de sus dos más recientes descalabros tanto en Líbano Sur contra la guerrilla islámica chiíta de Hezbolá como frente a Hamas en Gaza–, Israel exhibe dos notorios puntos vulnerables: 1. El agua (razón por la cual se encuentra reticente a devolver a Siria los territorios ocupados de las Alturas del Golán, contiguo al lago de Galilea; y 2. El petróleo: importa más de 300 mil barriles al día (en su mayoría, provenientes de Egipto), mientras su producción de gas se encuentra sumamente apretada para el consumo doméstico.
Acabamos de regresar de una gira por un mes a Grecia, Líbano y Turquía, donde nos percatamos de la relevancia estratégica del gas tanto de Gaza como del Líbano, que es compartido en los mares comunes con Israel y la isla Chipre (dividida entre griegos y turcos).
“Naharnet” (28 de junio de 2010), un portal pro occidental del Líbano, comenta atinadamente que las pletóricas reservas de gas compartidas en los mares por Líbano e Israel pueden representar un enorme maná financiero, pero que también pueden desembocar en una nueva guerra de Israel contra su débil vecino norteño.
Lo dramático del caso es que tanto Líbano como Israel dependen enormemente de las importaciones de hidrocarburos.
En cuanto al Líbano, la situación se torna más severa cuando padece un pésimo sistema eléctrico que no ha podido ser arreglado ni mejorado desde su guerra civil de 15 años.
Guste o disguste, en Líbano, nada menos que la guerrilla chiíta Hezbolá se ha adueñado de la carta de la defensa del gas libanés frente a la codicia israelí. Hasta ahora, fuera de Hezbolá, nadie del restante y extenso mosaico libanés ha salido a expresar su postura al respecto, que no es un tema menor que puede arrojar grandes dividendos políticos y financieros o, en su defecto, degenerar en una guerra de Israel contra Líbano (no al revés).
Hezbolá acusa, no sin antecedentes ni justificaciones históricas, que Israel planifica “robar” el gas natural de las aguas territoriales libanesas. Los chiítas del Sur de Líbano gozan de una gran experiencia en cuanto al saqueo de las aguas del Río Litani por Israel.
Por su parte, Israel alega que los campos petroleros y gaseros que desarrolla no se extienden a las aguas libanesas.
El problema yace en que los límites territoriales –por extensión, los marítimos– no han sido aún precisados debido a que ambos países se encuentran técnicamente en estado de beligerancia.
Israel se ha adelantado –debido a su mayor avance tecnológico y a la colusión de las petroleras y gaseras anglosajonas– a desarrollar los dos campos de Tamar y Dalit, cuyos abundantes hallazgos dispararon la bolsa de valores de Tel Aviv, coincidentemente el mismo día que el gobierno extremista de la dupla Netanyahu-Lieberman sufría el repudio global por su piratería homicida en aguas internacionales contra el barco turco de ayuda humanitaria a Gaza (la mayor cárcel viviente del mundo).
El descubrimiento de los campos de Tamar y Dalit es colosal: 160 billones (en anglosajón) de metros cúbicos que pueden cubrir las necesidades israelíes durante dos décadas.
La petrolera y gasera texana Noble Energy, que forma parte de un consorcio a cargo de las exploraciones de los yacimientos gaseros en la parte supuestamente israelí del Mar Mediterráneo, ha predicho que debido al descubrimiento de un tercer campo adicional –denominado en forma interesantemente semántica como Leviatán (con 450 billones de metros cúbicos; casi tres veces los yacimientos de Tamar y Dalit)–, Israel podría convertirse en un suculento exportador a Europa y a Asia.
Por lo pronto, Nabih Berri, líder del Parlamento libanés además de aliado de Hezbolá, increpó que Israel se está convirtiendo en un “emirato petrolero” con el gas ajeno, mientras ignora que los campos, de acuerdo con los mapas, se extienden a las aguas territoriales del Líbano. ¿Repetirá Líbano frente a Israel las trágicas experiencias que ya vive México frente a Estados Unidos en referencia a los yacimientos “transfronterizos” que se llevan unilateralmente las petroleras y gaseras texanas gracias a la tecnología cleptomaníaca del “popoteo”?
Los funcionarios de la Infraestructura Nacional de Israel –además, como era de esperarse, de la texana Noble Energy y la noruega Petroleum Geo-Services– afirman que los tres campos descubiertos se encuentran en la “zona económica” israelí. ¡Que precisión de la geografía divina!
South Lebanon (4 de junio de 2010), portal del Hezbolá, fustiga que “Israel está por legalizar el robo del gas del Líbano” mediante una enmienda legislativa. Cita a la televisión israelí que aduce que el gobierno de la dupla Netanyahu-Lieberman “trata el descubrimiento de los campos de gas natural en el Mar Mediterráneo como un descubrimiento israelí sobre el que nadie (¡súper sic!) tiene derecho”. ¡Ah caray! ¿Dónde queda el derecho internacional transfronterizo cuando la técnica del popoteo de lo ajeno es recurrida por las trasnacionales anglosajonas que poseen mejor tecnología que los países afectados, para no decir saqueados?
Peor aún, según la mencionada televisora, “el comité ejecutivo del gobierno y el Parlamento trabajan para conseguir una ley que no deje espacio a cualquier derecho libanés”. Y si no, pues allí está el ejército israelí para aplicar en forma unilateral su nueva ley del despojo.
Independientemente del legendario saqueo israelí en todos los ámbitos territoriales, con o sin “mapas” y/o leyes, también la clase política libanesa, debido a sus estériles querellas internas sobre la identidad del agraciado explorador y productor de petróleo y gas, ha perdido una valiosa década: vacío temporal y territorial que ha sido explotado por Israel.
En octubre pasado, la noruega Petroleum Geo-Services había indicado la alta probabilidad de pletóricos yacimientos tanto en Líbano como en Chipre. En este caso específico, parecería que los yacimientos serían compartidos por ambos países vecinos. ¡Qué trucos soberanos exhibe la geografía en cada caso!
Para Líbano, cualquier tipo de hallazgo gasero o petrolero sería una bendición para recortar su enorme deuda de 52 mil millones de dólares, una de las mayores del mundo (147 por ciento) en proporción a su producto interno bruto (PIB) de 33 mil millones de dólares.
Tampoco hay que exagerar la deuda libanesa, enorme sin duda, pero que es amortiguada por colosales depósitos bancarios que ascienden a 110 mil millones de dólares, lo cual facilita su manejo.
Sea lo que fuere, los nuevos descubrimientos de petróleo y/o gas en Líbano –soberanos y/o compartidos con Israel y/o Chipre– ascenderían a la mirífica cifra de 1 millón de millones de dólares (1 trillón en anglosajón), equivalentes al PIB de México, con la diferencia notable de que el país de los cedros milenarios solamente cuenta con 4 millones de habitantes.
Osama Habib, del rotativo libanés The Daily Star (28 de junio de 2010), dijo que “la riqueza del petróleo y el gas en Líbano significan una bendición mezclada” que causa al mismo tiempo “aliento y angustia” (por sus derivaciones geopolíticas) y ha expuesto a la luz del día el pleito primitivo de sus políticos para llevarse la mayor tajada del pastel del manejo de los hidrocarburos.
A juicio de los conocedores, la exploración en aguas libanesas tomaría unos 15 años para su concreción productora, pero el mayor riesgo proviene del apetito insaciable de Israel, que sería capaz, por enésima vez, de emprender una nueva guerra para adueñarse del gas de Gaza y de los hidrocarburos de Líbano y Chipre.
por Alfredo Jalife-Rahme*
9 de agosto de 2010
Red Voltaire
Varios analistas avezados habían detectado que detrás de la guerra de Israel contra Gaza –gobernado por el grupo islámico sunnita Hamas– se encontraban los pletóricos yacimientos de gas en las costas palestinas del Mar Mediterráneo.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pese a su dotación de un máximo de 400 bombas nucleares y de la mejor aviación de todo el Medio Oriente –ya no se puede aseverar que posea el mejor ejército de la región después de sus dos más recientes descalabros tanto en Líbano Sur contra la guerrilla islámica chiíta de Hezbolá como frente a Hamas en Gaza–, Israel exhibe dos notorios puntos vulnerables: 1. El agua (razón por la cual se encuentra reticente a devolver a Siria los territorios ocupados de las Alturas del Golán, contiguo al lago de Galilea; y 2. El petróleo: importa más de 300 mil barriles al día (en su mayoría, provenientes de Egipto), mientras su producción de gas se encuentra sumamente apretada para el consumo doméstico.
Acabamos de regresar de una gira por un mes a Grecia, Líbano y Turquía, donde nos percatamos de la relevancia estratégica del gas tanto de Gaza como del Líbano, que es compartido en los mares comunes con Israel y la isla Chipre (dividida entre griegos y turcos).
“Naharnet” (28 de junio de 2010), un portal pro occidental del Líbano, comenta atinadamente que las pletóricas reservas de gas compartidas en los mares por Líbano e Israel pueden representar un enorme maná financiero, pero que también pueden desembocar en una nueva guerra de Israel contra su débil vecino norteño.
Lo dramático del caso es que tanto Líbano como Israel dependen enormemente de las importaciones de hidrocarburos.
En cuanto al Líbano, la situación se torna más severa cuando padece un pésimo sistema eléctrico que no ha podido ser arreglado ni mejorado desde su guerra civil de 15 años.
Guste o disguste, en Líbano, nada menos que la guerrilla chiíta Hezbolá se ha adueñado de la carta de la defensa del gas libanés frente a la codicia israelí. Hasta ahora, fuera de Hezbolá, nadie del restante y extenso mosaico libanés ha salido a expresar su postura al respecto, que no es un tema menor que puede arrojar grandes dividendos políticos y financieros o, en su defecto, degenerar en una guerra de Israel contra Líbano (no al revés).
Hezbolá acusa, no sin antecedentes ni justificaciones históricas, que Israel planifica “robar” el gas natural de las aguas territoriales libanesas. Los chiítas del Sur de Líbano gozan de una gran experiencia en cuanto al saqueo de las aguas del Río Litani por Israel.
Por su parte, Israel alega que los campos petroleros y gaseros que desarrolla no se extienden a las aguas libanesas.
El problema yace en que los límites territoriales –por extensión, los marítimos– no han sido aún precisados debido a que ambos países se encuentran técnicamente en estado de beligerancia.
Israel se ha adelantado –debido a su mayor avance tecnológico y a la colusión de las petroleras y gaseras anglosajonas– a desarrollar los dos campos de Tamar y Dalit, cuyos abundantes hallazgos dispararon la bolsa de valores de Tel Aviv, coincidentemente el mismo día que el gobierno extremista de la dupla Netanyahu-Lieberman sufría el repudio global por su piratería homicida en aguas internacionales contra el barco turco de ayuda humanitaria a Gaza (la mayor cárcel viviente del mundo).
El descubrimiento de los campos de Tamar y Dalit es colosal: 160 billones (en anglosajón) de metros cúbicos que pueden cubrir las necesidades israelíes durante dos décadas.
La petrolera y gasera texana Noble Energy, que forma parte de un consorcio a cargo de las exploraciones de los yacimientos gaseros en la parte supuestamente israelí del Mar Mediterráneo, ha predicho que debido al descubrimiento de un tercer campo adicional –denominado en forma interesantemente semántica como Leviatán (con 450 billones de metros cúbicos; casi tres veces los yacimientos de Tamar y Dalit)–, Israel podría convertirse en un suculento exportador a Europa y a Asia.
Por lo pronto, Nabih Berri, líder del Parlamento libanés además de aliado de Hezbolá, increpó que Israel se está convirtiendo en un “emirato petrolero” con el gas ajeno, mientras ignora que los campos, de acuerdo con los mapas, se extienden a las aguas territoriales del Líbano. ¿Repetirá Líbano frente a Israel las trágicas experiencias que ya vive México frente a Estados Unidos en referencia a los yacimientos “transfronterizos” que se llevan unilateralmente las petroleras y gaseras texanas gracias a la tecnología cleptomaníaca del “popoteo”?
Los funcionarios de la Infraestructura Nacional de Israel –además, como era de esperarse, de la texana Noble Energy y la noruega Petroleum Geo-Services– afirman que los tres campos descubiertos se encuentran en la “zona económica” israelí. ¡Que precisión de la geografía divina!
South Lebanon (4 de junio de 2010), portal del Hezbolá, fustiga que “Israel está por legalizar el robo del gas del Líbano” mediante una enmienda legislativa. Cita a la televisión israelí que aduce que el gobierno de la dupla Netanyahu-Lieberman “trata el descubrimiento de los campos de gas natural en el Mar Mediterráneo como un descubrimiento israelí sobre el que nadie (¡súper sic!) tiene derecho”. ¡Ah caray! ¿Dónde queda el derecho internacional transfronterizo cuando la técnica del popoteo de lo ajeno es recurrida por las trasnacionales anglosajonas que poseen mejor tecnología que los países afectados, para no decir saqueados?
Peor aún, según la mencionada televisora, “el comité ejecutivo del gobierno y el Parlamento trabajan para conseguir una ley que no deje espacio a cualquier derecho libanés”. Y si no, pues allí está el ejército israelí para aplicar en forma unilateral su nueva ley del despojo.
Independientemente del legendario saqueo israelí en todos los ámbitos territoriales, con o sin “mapas” y/o leyes, también la clase política libanesa, debido a sus estériles querellas internas sobre la identidad del agraciado explorador y productor de petróleo y gas, ha perdido una valiosa década: vacío temporal y territorial que ha sido explotado por Israel.
En octubre pasado, la noruega Petroleum Geo-Services había indicado la alta probabilidad de pletóricos yacimientos tanto en Líbano como en Chipre. En este caso específico, parecería que los yacimientos serían compartidos por ambos países vecinos. ¡Qué trucos soberanos exhibe la geografía en cada caso!
Para Líbano, cualquier tipo de hallazgo gasero o petrolero sería una bendición para recortar su enorme deuda de 52 mil millones de dólares, una de las mayores del mundo (147 por ciento) en proporción a su producto interno bruto (PIB) de 33 mil millones de dólares.
Tampoco hay que exagerar la deuda libanesa, enorme sin duda, pero que es amortiguada por colosales depósitos bancarios que ascienden a 110 mil millones de dólares, lo cual facilita su manejo.
Sea lo que fuere, los nuevos descubrimientos de petróleo y/o gas en Líbano –soberanos y/o compartidos con Israel y/o Chipre– ascenderían a la mirífica cifra de 1 millón de millones de dólares (1 trillón en anglosajón), equivalentes al PIB de México, con la diferencia notable de que el país de los cedros milenarios solamente cuenta con 4 millones de habitantes.
Osama Habib, del rotativo libanés The Daily Star (28 de junio de 2010), dijo que “la riqueza del petróleo y el gas en Líbano significan una bendición mezclada” que causa al mismo tiempo “aliento y angustia” (por sus derivaciones geopolíticas) y ha expuesto a la luz del día el pleito primitivo de sus políticos para llevarse la mayor tajada del pastel del manejo de los hidrocarburos.
A juicio de los conocedores, la exploración en aguas libanesas tomaría unos 15 años para su concreción productora, pero el mayor riesgo proviene del apetito insaciable de Israel, que sería capaz, por enésima vez, de emprender una nueva guerra para adueñarse del gas de Gaza y de los hidrocarburos de Líbano y Chipre.
45. India and China: The Battle between Soft and Hard Power
South Asia
Aug 21, 2010
BOOK REVIEW
Reality check for Asian titans
India and China: The Battle between Soft and Hard Power by Prem Shankar Jha
Reviewed by Sreeram Chaulia
Views about the inexorable rise of China and India to global dominance have multiplied as the two storm ahead with impressive economic growth rates amidst a worldwide downturn. Speculation that these Asian giants will reconfigure the international order with their accumulating might has assumed an air of certainty, a matter of "when" and not "if".
But it is worth inquiring whether the market-based modernization in both countries is proceeding in a stable direction or setting up an implosion. Veteran Indian political economist Prem Shankar Jha plays the skeptic in a new book about China and India's abilities to reconcile economic growth with equity. Combining acute analysis of the history of capitalism and domestic weaknesses in the two fast galloping economies, he offers a caveat to assumptions about their ascent to greatness.
One paradox of China's record economic growth that Jha highlights is incomplete privatization. Half of industrial output is still generated by non-market entities allied to the state. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cadres of the central government and from five tiers of local government are engaged in competition for investable resources, leading to a chaotic misallocation of capital. Rivalry between these two strata of the CCP has bequeathed a unique problem of overheating and a struggle to bring down the rate of feverish investment and GDP growth.
Since "cadre capitalists", who form an "intermediate class", are part and parcel of the Chinese government, Jha shows how "every corrupt, predatory action that comes to light threatens the stability of the state" itself. He contrasts this to India's intermediate class of rent-seeking small and medium enterprises, which used to leverage the state to the detriment of big businesses, but "did not become the state". (p 55) Discontent and stress fueled by economic changes will therefore, Jha argues, be more problematic in China.
China's central government has often failed to mitigate exuberant investment sprees by local CCP authorities. Provincial administrations are responsible for unsustainable expansion of bank credit to finance real estate and special economic zone (SEZ) booms. Jha plots a series of overproduction and excess capacity bubbles succeeded by recessionary slowdowns to reveal the risks to stability posed by China's cadre-capitalism. The Chinese economy's inefficient use of raw materials and energy compared to India is also a harmful offshoot of cadre-capitalists piling up "dead investments" and duplicating industrial structures across provinces.
Jha argues that extortion of private land and excessive taxation of the lower classes has "undermined the legitimacy of the Chinese political system in the eyes of its people". (p 108) Mass alienation from the regime is the reason, the author says, "why a country with such an astounding rate of growth should be suffering so much public discontent". (p 128) The government is aware it is "living on top of a volcano", he writes, but is determined to stave off the only genuine solution - democratization. China is thus saddled with what Jha terms as a "predatory state that does not know how to reform". (p 273)
Resorting to physical violence to quell protests has become common as local cadre ensure that people's grievances are not taken higher up the party chain. Jha reproduces the judgment of the purged former CCP leader Zhao Ziyang from 2004 that "what China has is the worst form of capitalism." (p 238)
On the ills of India's economic metamorphosis, the author uses the refrain of intra-capitalist class conflict between large industrial houses and an "intermediate bourgeoisie" that flourished on artificial shortages. This tussle continued even after the economic liberalization of 1991, with myriad product category restrictions and bureaucratic foot dragging to protect tens of thousands of parasitic small and medium-sized enterprises. Only after 1997 did these intermediate firms shut down or reinvent themselves to become competitive through a managerial revolution.
The advent of an unfettered market economy in the last decade has, however, wrought new social strains. With the poor feeling abandoned by the state, a Maoist revolt rages across the breadth of central India. Market-dictated reorientation of funds from agriculture to industry and service sectors has triggered a gigantic rural crisis.
State-level governments in India are siding with the "new aggressive capitalist class" (p 282) on land acquisitions and wage depression, short changing the poorest sections of the peasantry, unorganized sector workers, and indigenous communities. In Jha's estimate, the central government's rhetorical ideal of "inclusive growth" has been undone by "an aversion to any reforms that will dilute the power of the newly empowered bourgeoisie". (p 309) He attributes the uptick in armed challenges to state authority in India to "the absolute powerlessness of the poor to obtain redress through legal expedients". (p 296)
Undemocratic China's time horizon to enact governance reforms for preserving social equilibrium is shorter than India's, but Jha contends that India too is facing a ticking bomb. The latter's democratic advantage is, he believes, "in danger of being lost" (p 328) through coalition politics and diminution of the central government's capacity to manage market-engendered social conflict. Neither country, he concludes, is assured of a rosy future bereft of instability if losers in society are ruthlessly trampled by the process of capitalist transformation.
A noteworthy contribution of this sobering book is to offer valuable insights into the multiplier effect of economic recessions on social and political instability that is inherent to the path of developmental "progress" adopted in China and India. The dangers of regime collapse in China and intensifying Maoist war on the Indian state are aggravated when growth engines slow down periodically and offload more onerous burdens on the shoulders of the downtrodden.
Jha's healthy dose of pessimism comes at a critical juncture when Asia's two behemoths are pressing on with astounding pace on the road to modernization. His book is a reminder that dark realities and high human costs lurk beneath the glitter of spreading market economies.
India and China: The Battle between Soft and Hard Power by Prem Shankar Jha, Penguin Books, New Delhi, 2010. ISBN: 9780670083275. Price US$13, 398 pages.
Aug 21, 2010
BOOK REVIEW
Reality check for Asian titans
India and China: The Battle between Soft and Hard Power by Prem Shankar Jha
Reviewed by Sreeram Chaulia
Views about the inexorable rise of China and India to global dominance have multiplied as the two storm ahead with impressive economic growth rates amidst a worldwide downturn. Speculation that these Asian giants will reconfigure the international order with their accumulating might has assumed an air of certainty, a matter of "when" and not "if".
But it is worth inquiring whether the market-based modernization in both countries is proceeding in a stable direction or setting up an implosion. Veteran Indian political economist Prem Shankar Jha plays the skeptic in a new book about China and India's abilities to reconcile economic growth with equity. Combining acute analysis of the history of capitalism and domestic weaknesses in the two fast galloping economies, he offers a caveat to assumptions about their ascent to greatness.
One paradox of China's record economic growth that Jha highlights is incomplete privatization. Half of industrial output is still generated by non-market entities allied to the state. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cadres of the central government and from five tiers of local government are engaged in competition for investable resources, leading to a chaotic misallocation of capital. Rivalry between these two strata of the CCP has bequeathed a unique problem of overheating and a struggle to bring down the rate of feverish investment and GDP growth.
Since "cadre capitalists", who form an "intermediate class", are part and parcel of the Chinese government, Jha shows how "every corrupt, predatory action that comes to light threatens the stability of the state" itself. He contrasts this to India's intermediate class of rent-seeking small and medium enterprises, which used to leverage the state to the detriment of big businesses, but "did not become the state". (p 55) Discontent and stress fueled by economic changes will therefore, Jha argues, be more problematic in China.
China's central government has often failed to mitigate exuberant investment sprees by local CCP authorities. Provincial administrations are responsible for unsustainable expansion of bank credit to finance real estate and special economic zone (SEZ) booms. Jha plots a series of overproduction and excess capacity bubbles succeeded by recessionary slowdowns to reveal the risks to stability posed by China's cadre-capitalism. The Chinese economy's inefficient use of raw materials and energy compared to India is also a harmful offshoot of cadre-capitalists piling up "dead investments" and duplicating industrial structures across provinces.
Jha argues that extortion of private land and excessive taxation of the lower classes has "undermined the legitimacy of the Chinese political system in the eyes of its people". (p 108) Mass alienation from the regime is the reason, the author says, "why a country with such an astounding rate of growth should be suffering so much public discontent". (p 128) The government is aware it is "living on top of a volcano", he writes, but is determined to stave off the only genuine solution - democratization. China is thus saddled with what Jha terms as a "predatory state that does not know how to reform". (p 273)
Resorting to physical violence to quell protests has become common as local cadre ensure that people's grievances are not taken higher up the party chain. Jha reproduces the judgment of the purged former CCP leader Zhao Ziyang from 2004 that "what China has is the worst form of capitalism." (p 238)
On the ills of India's economic metamorphosis, the author uses the refrain of intra-capitalist class conflict between large industrial houses and an "intermediate bourgeoisie" that flourished on artificial shortages. This tussle continued even after the economic liberalization of 1991, with myriad product category restrictions and bureaucratic foot dragging to protect tens of thousands of parasitic small and medium-sized enterprises. Only after 1997 did these intermediate firms shut down or reinvent themselves to become competitive through a managerial revolution.
The advent of an unfettered market economy in the last decade has, however, wrought new social strains. With the poor feeling abandoned by the state, a Maoist revolt rages across the breadth of central India. Market-dictated reorientation of funds from agriculture to industry and service sectors has triggered a gigantic rural crisis.
State-level governments in India are siding with the "new aggressive capitalist class" (p 282) on land acquisitions and wage depression, short changing the poorest sections of the peasantry, unorganized sector workers, and indigenous communities. In Jha's estimate, the central government's rhetorical ideal of "inclusive growth" has been undone by "an aversion to any reforms that will dilute the power of the newly empowered bourgeoisie". (p 309) He attributes the uptick in armed challenges to state authority in India to "the absolute powerlessness of the poor to obtain redress through legal expedients". (p 296)
Undemocratic China's time horizon to enact governance reforms for preserving social equilibrium is shorter than India's, but Jha contends that India too is facing a ticking bomb. The latter's democratic advantage is, he believes, "in danger of being lost" (p 328) through coalition politics and diminution of the central government's capacity to manage market-engendered social conflict. Neither country, he concludes, is assured of a rosy future bereft of instability if losers in society are ruthlessly trampled by the process of capitalist transformation.
A noteworthy contribution of this sobering book is to offer valuable insights into the multiplier effect of economic recessions on social and political instability that is inherent to the path of developmental "progress" adopted in China and India. The dangers of regime collapse in China and intensifying Maoist war on the Indian state are aggravated when growth engines slow down periodically and offload more onerous burdens on the shoulders of the downtrodden.
Jha's healthy dose of pessimism comes at a critical juncture when Asia's two behemoths are pressing on with astounding pace on the road to modernization. His book is a reminder that dark realities and high human costs lurk beneath the glitter of spreading market economies.
India and China: The Battle between Soft and Hard Power by Prem Shankar Jha, Penguin Books, New Delhi, 2010. ISBN: 9780670083275. Price US$13, 398 pages.
sábado, 28 de agosto de 2010
44.La Jornada Integración y soberanía
La Jornada Integración y soberanía
Integración y soberanía
Jorge Eduardo Navarrete
C
oncluye mañana en la UNAM un ciclo de seis mesas redondas, corganizado con la Asociación Nacional para la Reforma del Estado, destinado a reflexionar, entre otros temas, sobre soberanía y desarrollo, al que se dedicó la cuarta sesión, celebrada ayer. Recojo parte de mis planteamientos, sobre las tensiones entre integración y soberanía.
El “fin de la historia”, proclamado de manera por demás prematura hace ya dos decenios, no ha traído consigo ni la desaparición de los estados-nación, que habrán de continuar siendo las unidades constitutivas de la comunidad mundial, depositarias por excelencia de la soberanía, ni la disolución de este concepto, que más bien se ha diversificado y tornado más complejo y multivariado. Tampoco ha dado lugar a un estrechamiento del amplio abanico de niveles de desarrollo económico nacional.
Desearía ofrecer algunas reflexiones sobre la evolución esperable, en el horizonte de los próximos tres lustros, de estos dos ámbitos a la luz de las tensiones derivadas, por un lado, de tendencias manifestadas desde mediados del siglo XX, como los procesos de integración regional y la creciente globalización y, por otro, de las consecuencias y secuelas de la crisis que sacude, en este fin de decenio, a la comunidad internacional.
Esta crisis no debe subestimarse ni en su alcance ni en sus consecuencias, ni mucho menos darse por superada sólo porque algunas economías nacionales han reanudado un débil crecimiento y algunas entidades financieras y empresas privadas, rescatadas con dinero público, han vuelto a generar utilidades, sin por ello crear empleos suficientes. No conviene olvidar –como quisieran los voceros del capitalismo financiero desregulado– que esta Gran Recesión ha sido la de mayor hondura y gravedad desde la Gran Depresión, hace 80 años; que no se ha conjurado el peligro de que la actividad vuelva a contraerse de manera simultánea en muchas de las mayores economías; de que los niveles de desocupación son incompatibles con la recuperación de estándares de bienestar aceptables; de que es posible que se entre en un largo periodo de muy lento crecimiento y altas tasas de desempleo, que signifique una o más décadas perdidas en términos, por ejemplo, del cumplimiento de los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio.
(Dígase entre paréntesis que, a juzgar por algunas declaraciones oficiales, México se ha desprendido del planeta, para constituirse en una suerte de asteroide de la prosperidad: con una economía que crece más que aquella de la que depende; con niveles de empleo que se recuperan a gran velocidad, sin importar sus condiciones de precariedad; en el que se tiene mayor certeza de que las guerras se están ganando entre más aumenta el número de víctimas. En suma, escuchando el discurso oficial pareciera que el país ha alcanzado una forma extrema de delinking –desvinculación– de las condiciones mundiales.)
La integración regional ha sido uno de los acontecimientos distintivos de la segunda mitad del pasado siglo. Desde los primeros decenios de posguerra empezaron a manifestarse, en muy diversas latitudes y con propósitos diversos. Recuérdese que la Conferencia de Bandung (1955), de la que surgió el Movimiento No Alineado, precedió a la firma del Tratado de Roma (1957), poco antes del establecimiento de la ahora casi olvidada Alalc en 1960. Desde tiempos tan tempranos, el debate respecto de las cesiones de soberanía que supone el avance de los procesos de integración no ha dejado de estar presente tanto en la primera línea como en el trasfondo de la evolución de dichos procesos.
El caso de América del Norte es sui generis. El instrumento formalmente adoptado por los gobiernos y ratificado por los tres países, el NAFTA, ha permanecido prácticamente inamovible desde su firma y, por tanto, ha perdido relevancia frente a la dinámica de las relaciones trilaterales. En cambio, los nuevos ámbitos de cooperación –que rebasan con mucho las áreas comercial y económica y abarcan, como nueva área prioritaria, la de seguridad– se han introducido por medio de una serie de acuerdos administrativos que entrañan importantes cesiones de soberanía, desequilibradas y asimétricas, que se convienen sólo entre los gobiernos, al margen de la necesaria sanción legislativa. La ASPAN ha evolucionado al margen de las ratificaciones del Senado que la legislación mexicana demanda e, incluso, de un amplio conocimiento de los compromisos y las cesiones de soberanía asumidas.
Las secuelas de la actual Gran Recesión, que estarán presentes por la mayor parte del segundo decenio del siglo, hacen prever una perspectiva muy poco promisoria para la extensión y profundización de los procesos de integración y cooperación económica regionales e interregionales. De cualquier modo, se ha enraizado un concepto más acotado de soberanía y se ha extendido carta de naturalización al traslado de parcelas de la misma a entidades supranacionales. Los procesos de integración se han frenado, pero eventualmente habrán de reanudarse. Cuando esto ocurra deberán atenderse las asignaturas pendientes. Primero, el alcance de la integración. Las del futuro no podrán limitarse a unos ámbitos, como el intercambio de bienes o el movimiento de capitales, y dejar otros fuera por completo, como el laboral. Es cada vez más evidente el absurdo de pretender recibir trabajadores de otras naciones, sin aceptar y asimilar también las diversidades étnicas, lingüísticas, religiosas y culturales que ellos mismos portan. Segundo, la corrección de las asimetrías. Ningún proceso de integración regional o subregional será sostenible si no estrecha, de manera mensurable y evidente para todos, las asimetrías entre sus miembros. Tercero, la institucionalidad equilibrada y democrática, cuya ausencia dificulta, si es que no imposibilita, el consenso social respecto de las cesiones de soberanía indispensables para hacer avanzar los respectivos procesos.
Resolver la tensión entre soberanía e integración regional, presente desde los intentos iniciales de acercamiento regional en los primeros decenios de posguerra, es ahora y será en el futuro una de las claves para persistir en un camino que encierra grandes promesas de prosperidad compartida y convivencia pacífica, aunque las realidades que hasta ahora han producido hayan quedado cortas respecto de los designios iniciales. Como Martin Luther King en Estados Unidos, Schumann, Nehru y Prebisch se atrevieron a tener un sueño, el de la integración entre naciones, que está aún por cumplirse.
43.Asia Times Online China News, China Business News, Taiwan and Hong Kong News and Business
Asia Times Online China News, China Business News, Taiwan and Hong Kong News and Business
SINOGRAPH
No rush for China
By Francesco Sisci
BEIJING - The angry youths who used to shout anti-Japanese slogans were silenced, their older chauvinistic mentors behaved as if they had received a gag order. Newspapers ignored the news or exiled it to a corner, while senior officials tried to dodge the subject in talks with foreigners.
Figures released this week by the Japanese government indicate that China has replaced Japan as the world's second-largest economy, after the United States. The figures show that Japan's gross domestic product (GDP) for the second quarter of this year, seasonally unadjusted, totaled US$1.28 trillion. That compares
with $1.33 trillion for China.
As the world looks on with astonishment, admiration and fear, Beijing, however, is not swollen with pride, there is no public chest-thumping.
Overtaking Japan in fact removes the last fig leaf for the true economic comparison - ongoing openly for years - between China and the United States. The natural question now is: What will happen next? When will China's GDP surpass that of the US?
The answer primarily depends on the method of accounting that is adopted, with dozens of variants. If you consider purchasing power parity in overtaking the US, China could rise within 10 years. If the present value of their respective currencies is considered, it could happen in over 20 years. But if the Chinese yuan is revalued against the dollar, it will happen sooner.
If the US economy recovers, it may be a matter of 40 years, if it crumbles, it could be tomorrow, and if the Chinese economy collapses, it may never be.
Think-tanks across the world work full-time on various assumptions and predictions, but the results they churn out, seen with Chinese eyes, often seem more like reflected fears and psychoanalytic explorations than realistic scenarios.
Overtaking Japan, however, provides evidence that after more than 30 years of running the economy with a growth of about 10% per year, China did not collapse, and indeed may continue to run for many years.
So China really could return to being the center of the world. And then truly European culture and its "appendix" transplanted to the New World would be supplanted. In this, Japan would not have it so bad, since it could rediscover, as it is already rediscovering, its power in Asia by aligning with the new course.
However, China's impetus and the fear that sooner or later America really could become "number two" will change the mental and cultural reference points of the Americans, Europeans and many other countries.
China is afraid of this new climate, realizing, that like two cars fast approaching one another, an accident is more likely to happen. The point is, China is not desperately trying to become the world’s largest economic power; it is in no hurry and would be comfortable in second position for some time. Partly for this reason, China resists pressure to revalue the yuan, which would shorten the time it would take to overtake the US.
Government officials explain that news on China overtaking Japan as not being worth the paper it is written on, as it will take perhaps another 100 years for Chinese per capita GDP to reach the levels of Western countries.
Academics say that over 80% of all important patents are still produced in Europe and America, and as long as Beijing does not generate true technological innovation, everything is fake.
"Is it worth that much development if the air and water are the dirtiest in the world?" greens in China ask.
An important general, Liu Yazhou, only last week warned against the current Chinese race to "count money" and said the most significant thing was the primacy of the system, and here Beijing should learn from Washington.
All of these reactions possibly reflect ancient Confucian modesty, and reflect a desire not to turn economic comparison with the US into a threat or a confrontation. Beijing fears that growing numbers of foreigners would prefer that China collapsed and did not overtake the US, regardless that in this event millions of Chinese would be sent back into poverty.
The financial crisis that broke in the US in 2008 and then spread around the world pushed China into the international arena. Any new tremors in the West could take China to the very frontline, forcing it to make decisions with global implications, and Beijing is not prepared for this.
If the America economy were to crumble and it were then not able to keep troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, what would China do? If China replaced America, would it continue with a policy that kills many troops and overstrains the economy? Or would it stand back and accept destabilizing outbreaks on its doorstep?
The alternatives are all painful, and that is why China today, although hoping one day to overcome the US, wants this to happen much later rather than sooner.
All the same, with China overtaking Japan, it is much closer to our doorstep.
Francesco Sisci is the Asia Editor of La Stampa.
jueves, 26 de agosto de 2010
42.The Daily Star - Opinion Articles - Robert Gates, a conservative in the Ike tradition
The Daily Star - Opinion Articles - Robert Gates, a conservative in the Ike tradition
Robert Gates, a conservative in the Ike tradition
By Fareed Zakaria
Commentary by
Thursday, August 19, 2010
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Robert Gates’ latest efforts at reforming the Pentagon are modest. He is not trying to cut the defense budget; he merely wants to increase efficiency while reducing bureaucracy, waste and duplication.
The savings the defense secretary is trying to achieve are perfectly reasonable: $100 billion over five years, during which period the Pentagon would spend approximately $3.5 trillion. And yet he has aroused intense opposition from the usual suspects – defense contractors, lobbyists, the military bureaucracy and hawkish commentators. He faces spirited opposition from his own party, but it is the other Republicans, not Gates, who are abandoning their party’s best traditions in defense strategy.
Can anyone seriously question Gates’ ideas on the merits? He has pointed out that the spiraling cost of defense hardware has led to the absurdity of destroyers that cost $2 billion to $3 billion per ship and bombers that cost $2 billion per plane. He notes that while the private sector has eliminated middle management and streamlined organization charts, the Pentagon has multiplied its layers of bureaucracy. A decade ago, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld complained that there were 17 levels of staff between him and a line officer. Gates guesses that there are now about 30.
Gates has proposed initial reforms that include dismantling one command and eliminating 50 generals. To put this in context, we have almost 1,000 generals and admirals, a number that has grown 13 percent in 15 years, even as the armed forces have shrunk. Every layer of Pentagon bureaucracy is much larger than it was at the height of the Cold War. Paul Light of New York University’s Wagner School of Public Service notes that in 1960 the United States had 78 deputy assistant secretaries of defense. There are 530 today. Gates likes to point out that there are more musicians in US military marching bands than members of the Foreign Service. In fact, the Pentagon has 10 times as many accountants as there are Foreign Service officers.
Any thoughts of broader reforms or even budget cuts seem inconceivable, despite the tremendous pressure on the federal budget. While some Democrats have taken up this cause, most Republicans are blindly opposed. They should take the time to read two of Gates’ recent speeches, one to the Navy League, the other at the Eisenhower library.
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Gates is an unabashed admirer of President Dwight Eisenhower, whose portrait hangs behind the secretary’s desk. He respects Ike’s restraint, his emphasis on the trade-offs involved in funding the military and his reluctance to create what he called a “military-industrial complex.” Eisenhower understood, Gates reminded his audience at the presidential library in May, “that even a superpower such as the United States – then near the zenith of its strength and prosperity relative to the rest of the world – did not have unlimited political, economic and military resources. Expending them in one area – say, a protracted war in the developing world – would sap the strength available to do anything else.” Eisenhower “was wary of seeing his beloved republic turn into a muscle-bound, garrison state – militarily strong but economically stagnant and strategically insolvent.”
In the spirit of Ike, Gates asked: “Should we really be up in arms over a temporary projected shortfall of about 100 Navy and Marine strike fighters relative to the number of carrier wings when America’s military possesses more than 3,200 tactical combat aircraft of all kinds? Does the number of warships we have and are building really put America at risk when the US battle fleet is larger than the next 13 navies combined, 11 of which belong to allies and partners? Is it a dire threat that by 2020 the United States will have only 20 times more advanced stealth fighters than China?”
Eisenhower’s seriousness of purpose was reflected in more than just his military strategy. He also believed in fiscal restraint and that government should run deficits during recessions but surpluses during recoveries. In 1960 his vice president, Richard Nixon, implored him to cut taxes to give the economy a temporary boost – and thus help Nixon’s electoral prospects. Eisenhower declined, intent on leaving office with a budget surplus, which turned out to be the last one for more than three decades. Robert Gates is a genuine conservative in Eisenhower’s tradition. Unfortunately, between Gates and the painting behind him, there are only two of them in Washington these days.
Fareed Zakaria
is editor of Newsweek International.
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