53.Russian Cooperation with China and the United States

Tuesday, September 28, 2010  STRATFOR.COM  Diary Archives Russian Cooperation with China and the United States In a move that was received positively by the United States, Russia announced on Monday that it would not build or assist with the construction of any new nuclear plants in Iran other than the Bushehr plant. On the same day, the Russian government touted that its strategic relations with China would be strengthened and that Russian energy giant Gazprom was ready to supply China with enough natural gas to meet the country’s entire demand. Judging from these two developments, it would appear that Russia has become friendly with two of the world’s premier powers on issues that are very dear to them: the United States on Iran and its nuclear program and China with its insatiable appetite for energy. But in reality, Moscow did not make either of these moves out of benevolence or, in diplomatic terms, the need for international cooperation. Instead, these moves were a complement to — and a natural extension of — Russia’s resurgence in its near abroad and its view of the wider world. “Russian cooperation on issues that are strategically important to the United States and China both soothes possible tensions between these countries and Russia and potentially gives Moscow something tangible in return.” Russia has made several gains over the past few years in re-establishing the influence it had lost following the fall of the Soviet Union. After a chaotic and crippling decade in the 1990s, Russia witnessed the West encroach uncomfortably close to the Russian heartland, sweeping up former Soviet states and satellites in the Baltics and Central Europe into Western institutions like the European Union and NATO in 2004. Only months later, a series of Western-supported color revolutions from Georgia to Kyrgyzstan to Ukraine pressured Russia even further, with the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and its subsequent flirtations with NATO causing particular alarm in the Kremlin. These events threatened Russia at its core and in effect caused Moscow to focus all efforts on trying to rebuild what it had lost. A window of opportunity was presented to Russia in that the victor of the Cold War, the United States, then focused all its own efforts and resources on Afghanistan and Iraq. Backed by years of high oil and natural gas prices in the mid 2000s, Moscow was able to recuperate and take advantage of a distracted Washington to push back into its former Soviet periphery, epitomized by the August 2008 war against Georgia, a Western ally. But Moscow didn’t stop there. Russia began 2010 by forming a customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan, a partnership that goes well beyond economic issues into the political and security realms. Russia demonstrated it could foment a revolution of its own in Kyrgyzstan, one that resulted in a government in Bishkek that is not only allied with Moscow but is practically pleading for Russia to expand its military presence in the country. Also, after years of building up its presence through grassroots movements in Ukraine, the Orangists were defeated by a pro-Russian faction in an election even Western observers called free and fair. Now with Ukraine back in the Russian fold, Moscow has moved even further to increase its influence in places like Moldova and the Baltics. While these countries are by no means consolidated for Russia, Moscow feels it has re-created enough of a buffer with its presence and ties into these countries along with the other former Soviet states that at this point, all efforts do not need to be made at creating an antagonistic relationship with powers outside of its periphery. Instead, Russia finally has the room to maneuver and — at least on the surface — even bend and help countries that it normally would view suspiciously. That’s where Washington and Beijing come in. Russian cooperation on issues that are strategically important to the United States and China both soothes possible tensions between these countries and Russia and potentially gives Moscow something tangible in return. With the United States, cooperation on limiting Iranian actions in the nuclear and weapons arenas brings Washington to the negotiating table on issues like staying out of Georgia and U.S. investment in Russia’s drive to modernize its economy. With China, new energy deals bring Russia cash and a large market for its natural gas just as Europeans — however rhetorically — are championing diversification away from Russian energy with grand projects like Nabucco. But, crucially, this only jives with Moscow as long as Washington and Beijing stay out of Russia’s near abroad. Ultimately, Russia has little to lose and perhaps even something to gain from such efforts with the United States and China. But these moves should not be confused with a change in Russian tune to a more peaceful and benevolent power. Rather, Moscow’s willingness to cooperate shows the comfort and confidence that Russia has gained from the moves it has already made to feel secure in its near abroad. And if Washington and Beijing don’t stay out of Russia’s periphery, Moscow’s tune can quickly change. Give us your thoughts  on this report For Publication Not For Publication Read comments on  other reports Reader Comments