martes, 9 de noviembre de 2010

55.Russia's President Visits Disputed Kuril Islands


Stratfor logo

Russia's President Visits Disputed Kuril Islands

November 1, 2010 | 1253 GMT
Russia's President May Visit Disputed Kuril Islands
KAZUHIRO NOGI/AFP/Getty Images
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev (R) and Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan in Ontario on June 26
Summary
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev paid a visit on Nov. 1 to the Southern Kuril Islands, administered by Russia but disputed with Japan since the Soviet Union seized them during World War II. This visit reveals another example of recent Russian-Chinese parallel action, in this case over territorial disputes with Japan, and will heighten Japan’s sense of vulnerability in foreign affairs.
Analysis
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev on Nov. 1 visited Kunashir/Kunashiri, one of the Southern Kuril Islands — the small islands just north of Japan in the Sea of Okhotsk that Japan claims as its own. The visit, apparently the first by a Russian leader to the islands, is inherently provocative given the territorial dispute and the lack of a peace treaty between Russia and Japan following World War II, when the Soviet Union seized the islands. The Japanese government has protested to the Russian ambassador, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has called Japan’s response “unacceptable.”
(click here to enlarge image)
But the timing is also significant: Medvedev is scheduled to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Yokohama, Japan, from Nov. 13 to 14, where APEC leaders will gather and bilateral meetings will be held. The visit would put the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) leadership in the position of having to host the Russian leader immediately after inflaming Japanese nationalism in a dispute with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea in September, and APEC is hardly the forum for Japan to raise its concerns. Japan also cannot really depend on the United States for support, since U.S. President Barack Obama has more important matters to discuss in the U.S.-Russian relationship when he meets with Medvedev.
Despite the DPJ’s attempts to open discussions with the Russians over the long-standing island dispute after first rising to power in 2009, talks have gone nowhere. While the Japanese public harbors deep resentment over Russian administration of the islands, the islands are not a core concern to Moscow: They have limited economic value, their strategic value is minimal and they are not very important to the Russian public. In fact, for a high-enough price, Moscow would probably be willing to return the islands to Japan. But Moscow has not given clear demands, and Japan has not shown a willingness to pay any price set by Russia. If a deal were to take shape in the current context, it would likely depend on Russia seeking Japanese investment or technology to support its sweeping economic modernization and privatization plans — but so far, Japan has not been invited to cooperate, and there is little evidence that a deal on such terms is under negotiation.
Last time Medvedev was set to visit the disputed islands, in late September after meeting with China’s leadership, he canceled amid differing reports. (In Asia, reports said he canceled due to weather concerns, in Russia, after reconsideration due to the sensitivity of the visit.) Certainly the Kurils are not in a temperate zone or easy to get to, but there is nothing inherently preventing him from visiting the islands, since they are Russian-controlled, as emphasized by the current visit.
There are two significant factors to consider about his visit. First, it shows that Russia is continuing to act in coordination (however loose) with China. These two states have found a number of areas in foreign affairs lately where they can play off each other’s actions in a way that serves both their purposes — the handling of international sanctions over Iran’s nuclear program and the international response to North Korea after the sinking of the South Korean naval corvette ChonAn are primary examples. Since both states have long-running territorial disputes with Japan, they have a mutual benefit in pressuring Japan so that its territorial claims appear to lose credibility and its inability to respond effectively is highlighted.
Second, the incident highlights Japan’s current vulnerability. China’s growing boldness in international matters, especially in territorial disputes, has alarmed Japan, as has Russia’s recent return to the Pacific region (which Medvedev’s visit to the Kurils demonstrates). Even relations with the United States have been relatively uncomfortable since the DPJ government came into power and called for greater independence from the United States, and this uneasiness has continued despite the fact that relations have improved since their nadir in May and June when the first DPJ administration collapsed and the party chose a new leader. China’s growing boldness in international matters, especially in territorial disputes, has alarmed Japan, as has Russia’s recent return to the Pacific region. Each of these threats strike at Japan’s core strategic needs, but Japan’s political and economic weaknesses leave it few options to respond, though it has attempted to reinvigorate its foreign policy recently. In such circumstances, the DPJ can be expected to experience more domestic pressure and criticism, Japanese nationalism can be expected to rise and Japan should be watched closely to see how it attempts to respond to rebuild some of its perceived lost prestige and power.
Give us your thoughts 
on this report
Read comments on 
other reports

No hay comentarios:

Publicar un comentario